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What the Access to Justice Crisis Means 
for Legal Education 
Kathryne M. Young* 
Despite enormous social, legal, and technological shifts in the last century, the structure 
of legal education has remained largely unchanged. Part of the reason so little change has 
occurred is that the current model mostly “works”; it produces a professional class of lawyers 
to populate the ranks of law firms and government entities. At the same time, for decades, 
legal education researchers have considered it practically axiomatic that law school has room 
for improvement. 
In this Article, I argue that the access to justice crisis—a deficit of just resolutions to 
justiciable civil justice problems for everyday people—compels an overdue examination of legal 
education’s scope and purpose. If we assume that lawyers should have a major role in solving 
the access to justice crisis, as opposed to simply meeting individual legal needs, law schools 
must prepare lawyers to serve this role. I point to three categories of improvement that centering 
access to justice would necessitate: teaching a greater versatility of thinking and  
problem-solving, imparting a broader understanding of the ecosystem of justiciable problems 
and lawyers’ place in it, and structuring law school to impart the cognitive cornerstones needed 
for successful legal practice.  
Placing access to justice at the center of legal education would strengthen, not supplant, 
the traditional model. In addition to equipping lawyers to address everyday Americans’ justice 
problems, this Article’s proposals would make the legal profession nimbler and more resilient 
to social, economic, and technological changes, and help overcome some of the profession’s most 
intractable problems.  
  
 
* JD, PhD, Assistant Professor, University of Massachusetts, Amherst; Access to Justice Faculty Fellow, 
American Bar Foundation. Correspondence may be sent to young@umass.edu. I am grateful to 
colleagues who provided invaluable feedback, including Steven Aggergaard, Swethaa Ballakrishnen, 
Elizabeth Chambliss, Kristen Holmquist, Lisa R. Pruitt, Ann Southworth, and Michele Statz. Enormous 
thanks to Emily Taylor Poppe for organizing the “Thinking About Law & Accessing Civil Justice” 
conference at UCI Law, to Carroll Seron for her generous commentary on this paper, and to the other 
symposium participants for their collegiality and thoughtful critique. Thank you also to the members 
of the UC Irvine Law Review, who provided useful suggestions and careful edits. Conversations with 
Meera Deo, Bryant Garth, Liz Gaudet, Marc Miller, Rebecca Sandefur, Sudha Setty, Carole Silver, and 
Molly Van Houweling shaped my thinking as well. Finally, I am indebted to the scholars at the Center 
for the Study of Law & Society at the University of California, Berkeley, especially Catherine Albiston, 
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I. ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND LEGAL EDUCATION 
Each year, U.S. law schools enroll some of the most incisive thinkers in the 
country. And although most law schools function reasonably well in their current 
form, they have enormous untapped potential to produce lawyers who are well 
equipped not only to practice law in the traditional sense, but to fortify the 
profession, solve some of our thorniest problems of social inequity, and remain 
resilient in the face of social, economic, and technological changes. The pressing 
needs of the access to justice crisis cast light on several ways to bring these ambitious 
goals within reach. 
A. Justice Problems Versus Legal Needs 
Defining “justice” in the access to justice sense turns out to be less 
straightforward than one might suppose. Broadly, “justice” refers to fairness and 
equality: outcomes on whose moral acceptability most of us would agree. But this 
social justice understanding is not very useful in delineating what we mean by 
“access to justice,” because moral acceptability varies interpersonally. You might 
find it unfair or morally unacceptable that the government does not supply free 
prenatal vitamins to all pregnant women; I might find the omission acceptable. Is 
this lack of free prenatal vitamins an “access to justice” problem? It depends on 
whom we ask. To lawyers, these kinds of questions are sometimes interesting but 
rarely useful, and they are the kinds of questions that law students are  
socialized—sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly—not to ask in doctrinal 
courses: lawyers’ province, after all, is the law. 
But one degree narrower than this social-justice-oriented construct of access 
to justice is what we might call the “justiciability” construct, which defines access 
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to justice problems as matters that are theoretically actionable under the law. If state 
law guarantees prenatal vitamins to pregnant people, and a particular pregnant 
person cannot afford the vitamins and the state has no mechanism by which to 
deliver them, this would constitute an access to justice problem under the 
justiciability construct. If, on the other hand, the law was silent on the topic, there 
would be no access to justice problem under the justiciability definition, even 
though many of us would view the omission as a social justice problem. Scholars 
writing and working in the access to justice space often use the justiciability 
definition for clarity: if law has something to say about access to a thing, we can call 
blocked access to that thing an access to justice problem. 
The stickier task is defining the universe of potential solutions for justiciable 
problems within the access to justice realm. Do we need to use law, or lawyers, for 
access to justice to be achieved? In much of the literature, the answer has been yes.1 
Access to justice is treated as access to lawyers, or at least access to law. But even 
within the legal realm, is this the most useful definition? In the prenatal vitamin 
example, we might imagine a number of possible solutions to the pregnant person’s 
inability to afford vitamins to which she is (hypothetically) legally entitled:  
(1) She might consult a lawyer, who could file a claim or write a demand 
letter to the relevant agency. If no such agency existed, the lawyer 
could bring a legal claim.  
(2) She might go to court pro se and try to convince a judge to compel 
the government to give her the vitamins.  
(3) She might go to a nongovernmental public service organization that 
offers free vitamins and obtain them there.  
(4) She might use leftover prenatal vitamins from a friend who gave birth 
a few months earlier. 
From the pregnant person’s perspective, all four solutions could get her the 
vitamins she needs. Indeed, (3) and (4) might be fastest, and thus preferable. While 
she might be vexed to learn that she is legally entitled to receive free vitamins but 
that the government has created no mechanism for making this happen, her concern 
is not the law’s inability to deliver on its promise; her concern is getting the vitamins. 
The vitamins, not the procedure, are the “justice” she seeks. 
In contrast, though, in thinking about how to deliver people the just result to 
which they are legally entitled, much of the access to justice literature takes a 
lawyering-centric approach, asking not “How can this person get justice?” but 
instead, “How can law and the courts get this person justice?” As Rebecca Sandefur 
writes, “The distinction between a justice problem and a legal need turns out to be 
crucial, for these two ideas reflect fundamentally different understandings of the 
 
1. See, e.g., Bernice K. Leber, The Time for Civil Gideon Is Now, 25 TOURO L. REV. 23, 25 
(2009); Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y  
REV. 503 (1998). 
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problem to be solved.”2 Access to law is, in some cases, a means of accessing justice. 
It is not, in itself, access to justice.  
There are at least two problems with conflating access to justice and access to 
a lawyer. First, this conflation frames the justice crisis from the perspective of the 
legal system instead of from the perspective of the people who need resolution of 
their problems. Putting lawyers first and everyday people second is a little like 
supposing that the proliferation of colds and flus can best be solved by giving 
everyone greater access to traditional medical doctors. Doctors might help in a 
number of ways—identifying viral strains, doling out NyQuil—but even though 
doctors might be the best ones to come up with overarching preventative strategies 
and treatment policies, not every person suffering from a head cold needs to see a 
doctor. The second problem with conflating access to justice and access to 
traditional lawyering is that there are simply not enough lawyers to meet all the civil 
justice needs in the United States.3  
This all means that, assuming we believe lawyers should be central to solving 
the access to justice crisis, we need to rethink our assumptions about what lawyers 
should know and what lawyers should do.  
B. What Does Legal Education Have to Do with Access to Justice? 
In its current form, a strong legal education equips a newly minted attorney to 
provide access to law. A client walks into a lawyer’s office with a problem the client 
has identified as a potential legal problem. The lawyer provides a diagnosis, offers 
one or two possible approaches, and in consultation with the client, takes some 
action via legality, law, and/or the legal system. Access to law has been granted. But 
if what we care about is access to justice, the flaw in this approach is that most people 
suffering from justiciable problems will never walk into the lawyer’s office at all. 
Their greatest barrier to doing so will not be steep fees or lawyers’ availability, as 
scholars and practitioners long assumed; rather, it will be that they do not think of 
their problems as legal in nature.4 Nor will they attribute their justice problems to a 
failure of law or government or the legal system. Rather, they will see the problem 
as bad luck, karma, God’s will, or something else beyond their control.5 Faced with 
a justiciable problem, the average American is vastly more likely to do nothing at all 
 
2. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to What?, 148 DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 49, 50 [hereinafter 
Sandefur, Access to What? ]; see also David Luban, Optimism, Skepticism, and Access to Justice, 3  
TEX. A&M L. REV. 495, 512–13 (2016). 
3. See D. James Greiner, Dalié Jiménez & Lois R. Lupica, Self-Help, Reimagined, 92  
IND. L.J. 1119, 1122 (2017). 
4. Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing: Everyday Problems and Responses of 
Inaction, in TRANSFORMING LIVES: LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS 116 (Pascoe Pleasence, Alexy Buck  
& Nigel J. Balmer eds., 2007) [hereinafter Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing ]; REBECCA  
L. SANDEFUR, AM. BAR FOUND., ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA: FINDINGS 
FROM THE COMMUNITY NEEDS AND SERVICES STUDY (2014) [hereinafter SANDEFUR, ACCESSING 
JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA]. 
5. SANDEFUR, ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA, supra note 4, at 14. 
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than to seek legal help.6 The legal help sought represents what Sandefur calls the 
“tip of a gigantic iceberg.”7 Most estimates suggest that between seventy and eighty 
percent of justiciable problems—justice needs—remain unmet.8 These civil justice 
problems lie submerged invisibly beneath the ocean’s surface, where they exact 
enormous tolls on everyday people’s lives, families, livelihoods, and  
financial security.9  
If we want lawyers to solve only the visible, tip-of-the-iceberg problems, but 
more of them, legal education should keep doing what it is already doing, but more 
of it: more skills courses, clinics, loan forgiveness programs, incentives for students 
to work in public service, and so on. Plenty of visible iceberg tips are insufficiently 
attended to,10 and society would benefit from their just and effective resolution. On 
the other hand, if what we care about is access to justice, we need to think about 
how legal education can equip future lawyers to grapple with the iceberg’s 
submerged bulk. How can lawyers become creative, intuitive, knowledgeable, and 
effective enough to tackle the larger universe of unsolved justiciable  
problems—problems that the people experiencing them are not thinking about as 
“legal” at all?  
One possible response, of course, is that lawyers’ job does not extend below 
the iceberg’s tip. But to suggest that access to justice is not the province of lawyers 
is, I argue, an unnecessarily circumscribed vision of lawyers’ potential as thinkers 
and problem solvers. If you give smart people useful tools and a problem to solve, 
very often they will build useful things. Legal education can broaden the problems 
lawyers see and the tools they know how to use. If we want lawyers to address 
problems below the ocean’s surface, we need to teach lawyers how to swim. 
This Article is part diagnosis, part prescription, and part thought experiment. 
It stipulates that access to justice, including the fair resolution of justiciable 
problems, is the province of lawyers, and asks: How could legal education prepare 
lawyers to do the kinds of work that could solve the severe justice deficit in the 
 
6. Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing, supra note 4; see LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE 
JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS (2017) 
[hereinafter LSC]. 
7. Amicus with Dahlia Lithwick, Lawyers: Who Needs ‘Em?, SLATE (Aug. 17, 2019, 10:00 AM), 
https://slate.com/podcasts/amicus/2019/08/amicus-talks-to-rebecca-sandefur-on-the-civil-legal-
system-inequality-access-to-justice-and-whether-lawyers-are-always-the-answer [https://perma.cc/ 
3AXA-H8LJ ] (interviewing Rebecca L. Sandefur). 
8. LSC, supra note 6, at 33; Hugh Logue, Civil Needs Unmet: The Latent Demand for Legal 
Services, A.B.A.: BUS. L. TODAY (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/
publications/blt/2020/04/civil-needs-unmet/ [https://perma.cc/R33Y-CSDJ]; WORLD  
JUST. PROJECT, GLOBAL INSIGHTS ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE 108 (2019). 
9. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004); SANDEFUR, ACCESSING 
JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA, supra note 4, at 9–10; LSC, supra note 6, at 25–26. 
10. See, e.g., Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon from the Dynamics of Social 
Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 697 (2006); Andrew Scherer, Why People Who Face Losing Their 
Homes in Legal Proceedings Must Have a Right to Counsel, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS  
J. 699 (2006). 
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United States? In the remainder of Part I, I detail why reform is urgent. Then in 
Parts II, III, and IV, I offer three categories of recommendations.  
First, we need to teach lawyers how to think more expansively and effectively. 
We do a good job teaching them how to think “like lawyers,” but often do a poor 
job teaching them how to think like the people they serve, whether those people are 
corporate executives or hold minimum-wage jobs. Additionally, creative  
problem-solving and design thinking are robust tools for modern professional  
life—tools other professional schools have increasingly adopted, and from which 
law schools could benefit as well. Teaching skills like design thinking does not mean 
tossing out the case method or watering down the logical rigor of doctrinal 
instruction; it means teaching them that the most effective lawyers are versatile 
thinkers, and that they can control and deploy different modes of thought when 
their work calls for it.  
Second, we need to impart a broader understanding of the relationship 
between the legal profession and the justice deficit. New lawyers should know 
where lawyers are most effective: the substantive and procedural situations where 
lawyers help most, and where lawyers actually tend to do harm. They need to be 
introduced to new models of service provision for justiciable problems, including 
those outside the United States. They need to know when and how to partner with 
other service providers, including paralegals, limited license legal practitioners, 
ombudspersons, and other community resources. And they need to know when 
doing so is the most efficient and effective way to meet justice needs. Moreover, 
they need to learn how they, as lawyers, can figure out the justice needs of their 
community—including the justice needs of people who never walk into their 
offices—and how those needs can be met.  
Third, we need to make law schools into places that produce stronger, more 
resilient lawyers. This includes acknowledging the anxiety and depression that 
plague law students in great numbers. By making key pedagogical and structural 
changes to legal education, and by giving new professionals the cognitive tools to 
address these problems in their own practices, we can strengthen the profession, 
make lawyers more resilient, and build a foundation for chipping away at the 
profession’s most bedeviling problems.  
Part V is a starting point for contemplating how some of the proposed changes 
would fit into the existing law school curriculum. I argue that although an alignment 
of legal education with access to justice goals would necessitate additional courses 
and training, it could be accomplished with relative ease (and no omissions from 
the current standard curriculum). However, these changes will have minimal impact 
if they are adopted piecemeal, as “band-aid” solutions that do not have the kind of 
structural endorsement that confers legitimacy.  
C. Why Now? 
Law school reform has long been a popular topic of discussion among scholars 
of legal education and the legal profession. Economic and social crises are often 
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identified as fulcrums for curricular change.11 But by and large, no change has come, 
save the vast and valuable expansion of law school clinics.12  
In part, the “Why now?” question is rhetorical. If legal education has remained 
stolid in the face of recessions, wars, and cultural change, why is now a better time 
than before?  
One answer is the coronavirus pandemic, which will create new access to 
justice problem and deepen existing ones: more debt, more housing instability, more 
employment difficulties. These kinds of problems are significant in themselves, and 
frequently cascade to create additional justice problems. The need for access to 
justice solutions is, and will likely remain for many years, more dire than it has been 
in a very long time. Law schools and lawyers should be at the forefront of addressing 
this crisis. And since many law schools are experimenting with new learning 
modalities to cope with the pandemic’s continuing dangers, the moment may be 
opportune to rethink other aspects of legal education as well.13 
Another answer is that, pandemic or no pandemic, change is overdue. Ten 
years ago would have been a better time than now, and now is a better time than 
ten years hence. Now is the best time because additional postponement is risky to 
the legal profession’s health and harmful to ideals of justice. Although there are 
many areas where we could use more research, we know a lot about the gulf between 
the justice people need and the justice people get. Whether we call it a crisis, a void, 
a plague, a dearth, or a desert, we know for certain that the lives of low- and 
moderate-income Americans are greatly encumbered by unsolved civil justice 
problems.14 This is partly because poverty and inequality continue to rise. The 
 
11. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Education: Rethinking the Problem, Reimagining the 
Reforms, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 437 (2013); Kevin R. Johnson, Some Thoughts on the Future of Legal 
Education: Why Diversity and Student Wellness Should Matter in a Time of Economic “Crisis,” 65  
BUFF. L. REV. 255 (2017). 
12. In this Article, I talk primarily about transforming non-clinical legal education—though 
even this clarification is, somewhat, a false dichotomy. To be clear, I see law school clinics and 
experiential courses as natural allies and partners in creating the kind of change I advocate. One reason 
I am focusing so little on clinics is that while clinical courses have long experimented with different 
forms of innovative design and experiential learning, this has not been the case for the doctrinal classes 
we are used to thinking of as the “core” curriculum. My intention is not to bracket clinics off as 
orthogonal to the reforms I discuss, but rather to acknowledge that many of them already do many of 
the things I suggest legal education should do. Occasionally in this Article, I will mention specific ways 
clinical education might be integrated into the reforms I propose, but for the most part I leave this 
argument as an implicit one. 
 For discussions of the relationship between clinical legal education and access to justice goals, see 
Margaret Drew & Andrew P. Morriss, Clinical Legal Education and Access to Justice: Conflicts, Interests, 
and Evolution, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 194 (Samuel Estreicher 
& Joy Radice eds., 2016); Oluyemisi Bamgbose, Access to Justice Through Clinical Legal Education: A 
Way Forward for Good Governance and Development, 15 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 378 (2015). For an extremely 
rich discussion of how we might use clinical legal education to fundamentally transform legal education, 
see Gerald P. López, Transform—Don’t Just Tinker with—Legal Education, 23 CLINICAL L. REV. 471 (2017). 
13. Kathryne M. Young, Revealing the Social and Cognitive Processes in Law School that Create 
Unhealthy Lawyers, FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
14. See generally LSC, supra note 6, at 14. 
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economic gap between the bottom fifty percent and the top one percent is larger 
than ever before.15 And as economic inequality increases, the need for legal services 
will grow with it. “Some types of civil cases can be logically tied to growing 
inequality, such as dealing with family matters, housing, and consumer debt.”16 For 
other types of civil justice problems, the connection is less direct. As social safety 
net programs have diminished, a greater problem-solving burden has fallen on the 
judicial branch.17 It is now practically de rigueur for scholarly articles on access to 
justice to begin by reciting the fact that approximately eighty percent of access to 
justice needs, variously defined, go unmet.18 These unmet needs fall 
disproportionately on the shoulders of poor people and people of color, although 
middle-income people suffer as well.19 The access to justice crisis is, as Sandefur 
points out, partly a crisis of systematic racial and economic inequality.20  
The good news is that the access to justice crisis is finally beginning to garner 
the attention it deserves. Thanks to thoughtful empirical research by Sandefur and 
others, we know much more about the problem than we did in 2000 or 2010. For 
example, research is beginning to suggest the ways that individual characteristics,21 
as well as prior experiences with courts and the law22 shape people’s interactions 
with the justice system, which will ultimately allow us to create innovative designs 
for delivering much-needed services. We are learning more about how justice needs 
differ between groups—for example, those who live in rural areas versus urban 
ones.23 We are also building the kinds of scholarly knowledge about the relationship 
 
15. See, e.g., CHAD STONE, DANILO TRISI, ARLOC SHERMAN & JENNIFER BELTRÁN, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, A GUIDE TO STATISTICS ON HISTORICAL TRENDS IN INCOME 
INEQUALITY (2020). 
16. Colleen F. Shanahan & Anna E. Carpenter, Simplified Courts Can’t Solve Inequality, 148 
DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 128, 129 (citing JONATHAN LIPPMAN, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 
2011, at 1, 6 (2011)). 
17. See id. 
18. See generally LSC, supra note 6, at 14 (“Eighty-six percent of the civil legal problems faced by 
low-income Americans in a given year receive inadequate or no legal help[.]”); Rebecca L. Sandefur, 
What We Know and Need to Know About the Legal Needs of the Public, 67 S.C. L. REV. 443, 451 (2016) 
[hereinafter Sandefur, What We Know and Need to Know About the Legal Needs of the Public ]; Logue, 
supra note 8.  
19. SANDEFUR, ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA, supra note 4, at 9. 
20. Sandefur, Access to What?, supra note 2, at 51–53. 
21. See, e.g., Calvin Morrill, Karolyn Tyson, Lauren B. Edelman & Richard Arum, Legal 
Mobilization in Schools: The Paradox of Rights and Race Among Youth, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 651 
(2010); Kathryne M. Young & Katie R. Billings, Legal Consciousness and Cultural Capital, 54 LAW  
& SOC’Y REV. 33 (2020). 
22. Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1263,  
1267 (2016). 
23. Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local Funding of 
Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 312 (2010); Lisa R. Pruitt, Amanda L. Kool, Lauren Sudeall, 
Michele Statz, Danielle M. Conway & Hannah Haksgaard, Legal Deserts: A Multi-State Perspective on 
Rural Access to Justice, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 115–16 (2018). 
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between race, poverty, other life circumstances, and access to justice that will enable 
us to create solutions.24 
An access to justice framework also compels consideration of the connection 
between legal professionals’ well-being and access to justice goals—a link that may, 
at first, not be obvious. But as recent research shows, lawyers’ “susceptibility [to 
anxiety, substance abuse, and depression] begins in law school and eventually has 
an impact on society by affecting people who rely on lawyers to manage their 
everyday legal problems.”25 Creativity, competence, compassion, and logical 
reasoning skills are all undercut by the problems from which law students and the 
legal profession suffer most. 
Lawyers’ patterns of life dissatisfaction, mental health problems, and struggles 
with addiction have long been an open secret. However, recent data shows that not 
only are these problems not improving, but they are worse among newer lawyers 
than among more seasoned ones.26 Additionally, studies of law school connect the 
law school experience with unhappiness and inequality in the profession, providing 
empirical support for the long-held assumption that as an institution, law school 
cultivates anxiety, risk aversion, a preoccupation with status, and a tendency away 
from self-reflection.27 This finding is consistent with Sheldon and Krieger’s 
observation that as they continue through law school, law students on average care 
more about prestige and less about community service, except for its utilitarian 
function.28 Their internal motivation drops.29 And these changes are associated with 
mental health problems, like anxiety and depression.30  
Moreover, as law schools have diversified their student bodies, they have done 
a poor job ensuring that the institution matches students’ needs. My own survey of 
1,100 law students from over 100 American law schools suggests that women, 
nonwhite students, queer students, very conservative students, very liberal students, 
religiously observant students, and students from modest class backgrounds all felt 
excluded—and in rather large numbers.31  
 
24. See generally Greene, supra note 22; Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 23; Pruitt et al., supra note 23. 
25. Architects of Just.: Exploring Access to Just. in Ont., Improving Health, Improving  
Service: Well-Being in the Legal Profession and Access to Justice, CASTRO (Sept. 18, 2018), https://
castro.fm/episode/GxTyVz [https://perma.cc/9A8Z-UWVN]. 
26. Lawrence S. Krieger & Kennon M. Sheldon, What Makes Lawyers Happy?: A Data-Driven 
Prescription to Redefine Professional Success, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 616 (2015) [hereinafter Krieger 
& Sheldon, What Makes Lawyers Happy? ]. 
27. See id. at 566–67; Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Does Legal Education Have 
Undermining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, 22 
BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 261, 283 (2004) [hereinafter Sheldon & Krieger, Does Legal Education Have 
Undermining Effects on Law Students? ]. 
28. Krieger & Sheldon, What Makes Lawyers Happy?, supra note 26, at 592. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. KATHRYNE M. YOUNG, HOW TO BE SORT OF HAPPY IN LAW SCHOOL 83–101 (2018). 
Other research identifies a kind of “two-track” system in law school, in which some students, 
disproportionately white and male, feel a strong sense of identity and belonging and experience law 
school as a kind, gentle, and supportive place. But the second category, disproportionately women  
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Law students do not begin law school feeling alienated, depressed, and 
anxious. At the outset, 1Ls look a lot like their counterparts who are not in law 
school, with average levels of mental health problems such as depression, anxiety, 
suicidal ideation, substance abuse, and self-harm.32 Then, beginning in the first year, 
their subjective well-being plummets. And this is not just a first-year phenomenon; 
the decline becomes less steep in 2L and 3L year, but it does not recover.33 Kennon 
Sheldon and Lawrence Krieger’s work sketches a gloomy prototypical trajectory 
that follows new lawyers into practice.34 About one in six law students screens 
positive for clinical depression, one in three for clinical anxiety, and one in four for 
alcohol dependence.35 One in ten reported intentional physical self-harm within the 
past year.36 Yet, most law schools do little to impart the kinds of metacognitive skills 
that would reverse these trends, venturing into “wellness” territory only partially, 
timidly, and uncommittedly, as I will argue, infra.  
Considering law students’ well-being through an access to justice lens is useful 
for several reasons. It offers a chance to frame innovations as a practical part of 
lawyers’ training, every bit as essential to a new lawyer’s professional edification as 
her ability to interpret a statute or pinpoint relevant caselaw. It also has the 
advantage of being other-oriented in focus, not only self-oriented. That is, it 
encourages law students to think about their development as practitioners in a way 
that serves clients, as opposed to feeling like “self-help,” which tends to be 
stigmatized in the law school environment. The more we know about law students’ 
struggles, and the more we know about these problems’ continued manifestation in 
the legal profession, the more unconscionable it becomes to do so little about them.  
Finally, as I will discuss in greater depth below, the legal profession is changing 
rapidly. Some of these changes are technological: smartphone applications,  
web-based legal problem-solving and online dispute resolution portals, standardized 
web forms, and online sources of legal advice have made it more possible for people 
to solve—or at least, seek to solve—their legal problems via technological 
innovations. The coronavirus pandemic has accustomed many people to receiving 
professional services online (e.g., telehealth) that were previously provided in 
person. Other major changes to the legal profession include a new willingness on 
states’ parts to consider nonlawyer management of law firms and introduce new 
methods of nonlawyer legal services, including limited license legal  
 
and/or people of color, experiences a different social reality, and finds the same law school aggressive, 
hostile, and unsupportive. Celestial S.D. Cassman & Lisa R. Pruitt, A Kinder, Gentler Law School? Race, 
Ethnicity, Gender, and Legal Education at King Hall, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1209, 1280 (2005). 
32. Sheldon & Krieger, Does Legal Education Have Undermining Effects on Law Students?, supra 
note 27, at 262, 280. 
33. Id. at 262. 
34. See generally Krieger & Sheldon, What Makes Lawyers Happy?, supra note 26. 
35. Jerome M. Organ, David B. Jaffe & Katherine M. Bender, Suffering in Silence: The Survey of 
Law Student Well-Being and the Reluctance of Law Students to Seek Help for Substance Use and Mental 
Health Concerns, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 116, 145 (2016). 
36. Id. at 139. 
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practitioners—in part to address the access to justice crisis. These changes 
necessitate different ways of thinking about the practice of law and the role of 
lawyers; we need to equip lawyers to think carefully and critically about these shifts 
in the profession while they are still in law school.  
II. TEACHING VERSATILITY OF THINKING 
“Thinking like a lawyer,” albeit variously defined by legal education scholars, 
has long been a linchpin of U.S. legal education. Under the general pedagogical 
consensus, it includes logical thinking, the ability to identify relevant parts of an 
argument, and the ability to mount an argument by applying facts to law. Solving 
legal problems demands particular types of logic.  
But instead of teaching lawyerly thinking as a skill, too often law schools treat 
“thinking like a lawyer” as a way of life—as a transmogrification of personality. We 
tend to talk about it in terms of transforming their brains. We say things like, “After 
law school, you will never be able to think the same way again.” And we are largely 
successful in this transformation—though not always to lawyers’ benefit.  
In my survey of 1,100 from over 100 U.S. law schools, many respondents 
discussed the ways that “thinking like a lawyer” had changed them.37 They discussed 
becoming unable to think in abstract, nonlawyerly ways. For example:  
I came into law school . . . with unwavering ethics, compassion, and 
understanding. I was someone who questioned everything that didn’t make 
sense, especially policy. This mindset is cancerous to the law school 
environment—you can fight back or you can conform. . . . [E]ither way 
your identity will die.38 
Respondents discussed being encouraged to think in ways that created “jaded 
contempt”39 and changed their personalities. “Thinking like a lawyer is real. And it 
creates ripples beyond the professional realm,”40 one student wrote. Another 
described the “thinking like a lawyer” as a “necessary evil” to do well in law school.41 
In other words, we show them where the “on” switch is without letting them know 
that there is also an “off” switch—nor teaching them how to use it. 
And, indeed, thinking like a lawyer is a tremendously useful skill in legal 
practice—perhaps the most useful skill a law student can develop. At the same time, 
one does not always need to think like a lawyer—certainly not in life, but not even 
in legal practice. At times, it becomes useful to see things from a client’s point of 
view, a judge or jury’s point of view, or a policymaker’s point of view. As I have 
argued elsewhere, “thinking like a lawyer” is no more magical than thinking like a 
chef, or a psychologist, or an auto mechanic.42 Teaching and socializing students as 
 
37. YOUNG, supra note 31. 
38. Id. at 38. 
39. Id. 
40. Survey responses (on file with author). 
41. Id. 
42. YOUNG, supra note 31, at 41. 
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if “thinking like a lawyer” holds mystical, transformative properties, rather than 
treating it as a tool to deploy in appropriate circumstances, is not only harmful to 
students, but an unrealistic fit for the demands of practice. (One student described 
law school as a “3-year boot camp for your brain where they teach you how to think 
like a lawyer, but not really how to be one.”43) 
In the rest of this Part, I point to two other ways of thinking that would be 
useful to lawyers, could be cultivated in law school, and would be instrumental in 
equipping legal professionals to solve the access to justice crisis. I do not suggest 
that we eliminate or de-emphasize traditional modes of legal thinking, but rather 
that in addition to teaching legal reasoning, we deliberately and systematically 
require students to learn and practice complementary modes of thinking. One 
involves teaching law students how nonlawyers think about the law—an area of 
sociolegal studies known as legal consciousness. The other involves teaching 
lawyers creative problem-solving in the form of design thinking skills, which are 
now routinely taught as part of professional development to business and 
engineering students and could expand lawyers’ ability to tackle complex issues for 
which legal reasoning is less useful in isolation. I discuss each in turn below.  
A. Legal Consciousness: Thinking Like a Nonlawyer  
Most people suffering from justiciable problems do not think of their 
problems as “legal.” This is a crux of the sizeable disjuncture between legal practice 
and access to justice, where access to justice is defined as the equitable resolution 
of justiciable problems.44 Knowing that the problems they see are only the tip of 
the “enormous iceberg of civil-justice activity”45 would help lawyers gain greater 
perspective on how traditional lawyering is, and is not, solving people’s problems. 
More importantly, understanding how people subjectively experience justiciable 
problems, and why they may or may not seek lawyers for these problems’ resolution, 
can help lawyers interact more effectively with clients, in ways that incorporate 
clients’ perspectives.  
Nor is legal consciousness equivalent to “understanding how poor people 
think.” Understanding how all nonlawyers think about law is useful whether a new 
lawyer is works at a community legal aid clinic or does mergers and acquisitions at 
a large firm. Regardless of whom they serve, when practicing attorneys list the skills 
they wish they had learned in law school, better interaction with clients is near the 
top of the list. 46 Yet the knowledge and skills necessary for effective attorney-client 
interaction tends to be taught mostly in clinical courses, which are not required by 
 
43. Survey responses (on file with author). 
44. See Sandefur, Access to What?, supra note 2, at 51. 
45. Id. at 50. 
46. Kathryne M. Young, Original Survey Results [hereinafter Young, Original Survey Results ] 
(on file with author). 
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the American Bar Association,47 rarely required by individual law schools,48 and 
typically include one-on-one instruction about a specific client’s specific legal 
problem, as opposed to an overview of how different people think about, 
understand, and experience various kinds of legal problems.  
Simply put, the study of legal consciousness is the study of how nonlawyers 
think about law: “[T]he ways in which law is experienced and interpreted by specific 
individuals as they engage, avoid, or resist the law or legal meanings.”49 It includes 
understanding the factors that make people eager or reluctant to use law to solve 
problems, knowing about common client misunderstandings and where they come 
from, and appreciating how specific groups tend to react to legal procedures and 
outcomes.50 Additional work about people’s perceptions of and willingness to use 
the law is sometimes referred to by other descriptors such as legal cynicism51 and 
legal mobilization52—concepts closely related to legal consciousness, and which we 
might think of legal consciousness as encompassing.53  
 
47. The ABA requirements state that for a law school to be accredited, it must require a student 
to complete at least six credits’ worth of “experiential courses” to practice law which can include field 
placements, clinical courses, or experiential courses of various types. See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA 
STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2017–2018, at Standards 
303(a), 304 (2017). This was an important curricular reform and a huge step in the right direction.  
48. As of October 2018, only forty-three of the more than 200 accredited law schools in the 
United States required a student to complete a clinic or externship. Peter A. Joy, Challenges to Legal 
Education, Clinical Legal Education, and Clinical Scholarship, 26 CLINICAL L. REV. 237, 238–39 (2019). 
As legal education scholars have pointed out, law students’ experiential requirement for graduation is 
less than their professional counterparts’, such as doctors, social workers, and veterinarians. Peter  
A. Joy, Law Schools and the Legal Profession: A Way Forward, 47 AKRON L. REV. 177, 196 (2014). See 
generally Peter A. Joy, The Uneasy History of Experiential Education in U.S. Law Schools, 122  
DICK. L. REV. 551 (2018). 
49. Susan S. Silbey, Legal Culture and Legal Consciousness, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 8623, 8626 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001). 
50. For further foundational reading on legal consciousness within the law and society 
movement, see, for example, Susan S. Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 323 
(2005); and Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of Ordinary 
Citizens About Law and Street Harassment, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1055 (2000). As I have argued 
elsewhere, legal consciousness is less a narrowly circumscribed subfield, and more a theoretical tool 
broad enough to encompass and draw together seemingly disparate strands of law and society literature 
that are concerned with power and relationality. Young & Billings, supra note 21, at 34–35. 
51. See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Dawn Jeglum Bartusch, Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) 
Tolerance of Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 777 (1998); 
David S. Kirk & Mauri Matsuda, Legal Cynicism, Collective Efficacy, and the Ecology of Arrest, 49 
CRIMINOLOGY 443 (2011); Monica C. Bell, Situational Trust: How Disadvantaged Mothers Reconceive 
Legal Cynicism, 50 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 314 (2016). 
52. See, e.g., Charles R. Epp, Connecting Litigation Levels and Legal Mobilization: Explaining 
Interstate Variation in Employment Civil Rights Litigation, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 145 (1990); MICHAEL 
W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL 
MOBILIZATION (1994); Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J. 663 (2012). 
53. Kennedy et al. make an intriguing and related argument for teaching “place consciousness” 
in law school, which could certainly be seen as an aspect of legal consciousness as well. Amanda 
Kennedy, Trish Mundy, Jennifer Nielsen, Caroline Hart, Richard Coverdale, Reid Mortensen, Theresa 
Smith-Ruig & Claire Macken, Educating Law Students for Rural and Regional Legal Practice: Embedding 
Place Consciousness in Law Curricula, 24 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 7, 9–10 (2014). For a discussion of the 
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For lawyers to be central to solving the access to justice crisis, they need to be 
able to identify how and where justiciable needs manifest. This aptitude would help 
them design outreach programs that would meet the needs of populations with 
specific justice deficits. One example of this kind of outreach is “legal checkup” 
programs,54 but many other programs model how lawyers’ effectiveness in meeting 
a community’s justice needs are increased by understanding how people experience 
problems. And again, although sociolegal scholars often study legal consciousness 
among middle- and lower-income people, understanding how a client thinks about 
law is useful to lawyers in virtually every practice setting. 
Additionally, understanding how everyday people think about law can help 
lawyers identify specific hurdles to justiciable problem-solving in particular 
communities. For example, Sarah Sternberg Greene’s empirical examination of a 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, housing project suggests that negative experiences with 
police can make people unwilling to pursue legal solutions even to civil justice 
problems unrelated to the criminal justice system; from their perspective, “seeking 
out lawyers and going to court for civil justice issues would mean bringing 
themselves back into the claws of an institution that they do not understand and in 
which they feel lost, risking the very same feelings of shame and failure they wish 
to avoid.”55 Similarly, Pascoe Pleasence and Nigel Balmer have found that people 
who believe that they have handled their own civil legal problems poorly in the past, 
or who experienced civil legal outcomes they believe were unfair, are less likely to 
take future problem-solving actions, instead experiencing frustration and 
resignation.56 Additionally, even among people with negative past experiences with 
the police, Black individuals are less likely to trust legal institutions than white 
individuals are.57 Overcoming or incorporating this distrust into the resolution of 
justiciable problems is crucial for access to justice to be racially equal. Greene also 
found that her respondents distrusted no-cost legal services and assumed that a free 
lawyer would rarely be a good lawyer.58 This made it less likely that they would enlist 
a lawyer’s services to solve their justiciable problems.  
 
significance of time and place in understanding what an injury is, see, for example, INJURY AND 
INJUSTICE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF HARM AND REDRESS (Anne Bloom, David M. Engel  
& Michael McCann eds., 2018). 
54. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Pro Bono Center, Legal Checkups - Smart Practices for a Healthy Business, 
LAWHELP.ORG/DC (May 1, 2018), https://www.lawhelp.org/dc/resource/podcast-legal-checkups-
smart-practices-for-a-healthy-business [https://perma.cc/J7PH-YZN6]; see also, e.g., Legal Health 
Checks, EQUAL JUST., https://www.cba.org/CBA-Equal-Justice/Resources/Legal-Health-Checks 
[https://perma.cc/69NK-7N6E] ( last visited July 18, 2020).  
55. Greene, supra note 22. 
56. Pascoe Pleasence & Nigel Balmer, Measuring the Accessibility and Equality of Civil Justice, 
10 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 255 (2018). As the authors discuss, this accords with Sandefur’s (2007) 
argument that people who repeatedly fail to solve civil justice problems are more likely to respond with 
inaction in the face of future problems. Id. at 286–89; see Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing, 
supra note 4. 
57. Greene, supra note 22, at 1268. 
58. Id. at 1291. 
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Thus, providing access to justice for diverse populations requires more than 
simply offering services. It requires outreach that can overcome past negative 
experiences, avoid the dehumanization people have experienced in past interactions 
with government and the courts, and provide services sensitive to these experiences 
to retain client participation and confidence. It may also entail creating solutions 
that are technically extralegal, but work in concert with, or orthogonally to, the legal 
system. That is, both legal and nonlegal solutions to justiciable problems can require 
knowledge of law and the legal system, as well as understanding of how legal 
consciousness shapes people’s willingness and ability to pursue particular solutions 
over others. As Greene writes, “[A]ccess problems are broader than just structural 
and systemic restraints—there are also cultural and cognitive barriers to access that 
need to be considered.”59 Knowledge of these variations in legal consciousness is 
crucial for practicing lawyers.  
In addition to helping lawyers understand how everyday people experience 
and think about the law, deeper knowledge of the legal consciousness literature 
could be helpful in litigation, particularly where legal issues hinge on subjective 
perception. To take an example from criminal law, routine litigation of Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment matters often involve a “reasonable person” standard. To litigate 
these issues persuasively, lawyers could draw on the social science literature about 
how different groups of people think about law60: when most people have an 
expectation that their home or belongings will be private from government 
intrusion, when they feel at liberty to leave an encounter with police, and so on.61 
Instead, lawyers tend to appeal to judges’ sensibilities, which differ considerably 
from everyday people’s.62 We might even imagine that greater attention to legal 
consciousness could forge productive collaborations between practicing attorneys 
and scholars of legal consciousness. Practitioners could help researchers identify key 
issues of legal or policy significance; researchers could help practitioners understand 
 
59. Id. at 1270. It is important to acknowledge a few limitations of Greene’s study. For example, 
it contained little racial variation (only Blacks and whites were studied), no geographical variation, used 
snowball sampling (meaning that respondents’ interpersonal interactions or shared history or narratives 
may have shaped the results), and little variation along the lines of social class or cultural capital, since 
her respondents came from a single housing project. Id. at 1283–84. Additionally, her questionnaire 
began with a demographic inventory, which may have primed respondents to think about race, and 
from her account appears to have asked about experiences with criminal justice before asking about 
civil justice problems, id. at 1286, which may have primed respondents to connect their experiences 
with the criminal justice system to their subsequent answers about how they would handle civil justice 
problems. Nonetheless, Greene’s work represents a significant step forward in the empirical access to 
justice research, and her empirical findings underscore the idea that past experiences with law can affect 
people’s approach to civil justice problems they face. 
60. Indeed, this empirical approach was suggested by Justice Breyer during oral argument in 
Brendlin v. California. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007) 
(No. 06-8120). 
61. See Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, Fact and Fiction in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 66 S.C. L. REV. 445 (2014); Young & Billings, supra note 21. 
62. See Kathryne M. Young, Rights Consciousness in Criminal Procedure: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Inquiry, 12 SOCIO. CRIME L. & DEVIANCE 67, 74, 88 (2009). 
First to Printer_Young.docx (Do Not Delete) 2/3/21  8:56 PM 
826 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:811 
empirical work that bears upon questions of law that turn social scientific 
assumptions about the ways people think. 
Attaining meaningful access to justice in the United States demands that 
lawyers know something about the social experiences that shape legal consciousness 
and the textures and dimensions of legal consciousness itself. A more nuanced 
understanding of how different groups experience and think about justice problems, 
as well as a more complete understanding of how people come to hold beliefs and 
attitudes about the law, and why they do or do not pursue legal solutions to their 
civil justice problems, are crucial to developing effective solutions to the access to 
justice crisis. Without it, lawyers are ill equipped to design solutions63 that meet 
people where they are as individuals, as opposed to assuming that justice solutions 
necessarily stem from being able to think only like a lawyer. 
B. Design Thinking  
Although “design thinking” lacks a universally agreed-upon definition, most 
scholars working in the area consider it to encompass the collection of  
problem-solving skills relied upon by designers, such as mechanical engineers and 
business innovators. It uses several specific techniques to generate new solutions to 
“sticky” (complex) problems, most of which emphasize creativity and collaboration, 
and has its historical roots in mathematics, art, architecture, and product design.64 
Thomas Lockwood, past president of the Design Management Institute, defines 
design thinking as “a human-centered innovation process that emphasizes 
observation, collaboration, fast learning, visualization of ideas, rapid concept 
prototyping, and concurrent business analysis.”65 
In legal education, design thinking offers a particularly powerful counterpart 
to traditional legal thinking. Whereas “thinking like a lawyer” 
necessitates the ability to narrow one’s thinking effectively, design thinking 
 
63. As many others have pointed out, there are real obstacles to engaging in many kinds of 
access to justice work after law school—financial barriers chief among these, and geographic barriers 
close behind. But with law schools’ commitment and collaboration, these barriers can be surmountable. 
For example, for discussion of one entrepreneurial model, see Carroll Seron, Managing Entrepreneurial 
Legal Services: The Transformation of Small-Firm Practice, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES 
63 (Robert L. Nelson, David M. Trubek & Rayman L. Solomon eds., 1992). For a discussion of 
programs designed to increase access to justice related to the rural lawyer shortage, including law 
schools’ role in alleviating the rural justice deficit, see Lisa R. Pruitt, J. Cliff McKinney II & Bart 
Calhoun, Justice in the Hinterlands: Arkansas as a Case Study of the Rural Lawyer Shortage and  
Evidence-Based Solutions to Alleviate It, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 573 (2015). South Dakota’s 
model program offers an initiative, funded partly by the state bar and the counties themselves, that 
gives stipends to law school graduates who commit to five years of practice in a rural county. Wendy 
Davis, No Country for Rural Lawyers: Small-Town Attorneys Still Find It Hard to Thrive, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 1, 
2020 12:00 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/no-country-for-rural-lawyers 
[https://perma.cc/88RS-5W2G]; see also Erika J. Rickard, The Role of Law Schools in the 100% Access 
to Justice Movement, 6 IND. J.L. & SOC. EQUAL. 240 (2018). 
64. See DESIGN THINKING: INTEGRATING INNOVATION, CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE, AND 
BRAND VALUE 4–7 (Thomas Lockwood ed., 2009). 
65. Id. at xi. 
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necessitates the ability to broaden one’s thinking effectively. Margaret Hagan, 
Director of the Legal Design Lab at Stanford Law School, envisions legal design 
thinking as being fundamentally “about increasing a person’s capacity to make 
strategic decisions for herself. Its target is more the brain, and less the heart or the 
wallet. Legal design aims to build environments, interfaces, and tools that support 
people’s smartness—and to shift the balance between the individual and the 
bureaucracy.”66 Like access to justice itself, design thinking in the legal context 
means centering the person who seeks the justice, as opposed to centering lawyers 
and the law.  
One common design thinking technique, “rapid prototyping,”67 entails 
generating multiple potential solutions in short succession in order to test a large 
number of ideas before expending resources to pursue them.68 Testing assumptions 
early is economically efficient and teaches people to think beyond a problem’s most 
standard, obvious solutions.69 In the legal world, rapid prototyping can help lawyers 
determine the universe of possible legal and extralegal solutions to meet a  
client’s needs.  
Another design thinking methodology, “radical collaboration,” is the skill of 
effective cooperation, coordination, and/or brainstorming with people who come 
from very different backgrounds to solve a problem.70 For example, in thinking 
about how to address a particular type of landlord-tenant dispute in a given 
jurisdiction, a lawyer might seek the collaboration of landlords, tenants, the local 
housing authority, community organizers, or builders. Part of radical collaboration 
is learning how to effectively deploy people from different backgrounds to solve a 
common problem.71 Since solving the access to justice crisis will require a variety of 
different approaches to problems, not merely standard legal approaches, teaching 
lawyers this skill is important. 
While design thinking has become popular in business schools, it has only 
begun to gain real traction in the worlds of legal education and legal practice. Many 
law schools now offer a small seminar, lab, or clinic focused on design thinking. But 
with few exceptions, tenure-track faculty do not teach these courses (a problem I 
will discuss, infra), nor are law students required to take them, nor do they enroll 
more than a very small percentage of each law school class. 
 
66. Margaret Hagan, Legal Design, LAW BY DESIGN, http://www.lawbydesign.co/legal-
design/ [https://perma.cc/CTR9-CMYJ] ( last visited Dec. 17, 2020). 
67. Daniel Schwarz, What Is Rapid Prototyping?, INVISION (Nov. 5, 2018), https://
www.invisionapp.com/inside-design/rapid-prototyping/ [https://perma.cc/YK4B-EBE4]. 
68. See, e.g., Rikke Friis Dam & Teo Yu Siang, Design Thinking: Get Started with Prototyping, 
INTERACTION DESIGN FOUND. (2020), https://www.interaction-design.org/literature/article/design-
thinking-get-started-with-prototyping [https://perma.cc/3VCQ-JC7L]. 
69. Schwarz, supra note 67.  
70. See, e.g., Tad Simons, Arvind Gupta & Mary Buchanan, Innovation in R&D: Using Design 
Thinking to Develop New Models of Inventiveness, Productivity and Collaboration, 17  
J. COM. BIOTECHNOLOGY 301, 304–06 (2011). 
71. Id. at 303–04. 
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But design thinking holds great transformative potential, particularly in the 
access to justice realm. Hagan has detailed the ways in which the kinds of 
participatory design taught in design thinking courses can give lawyers insight 
“about what tools can provide the assistance that people actually need, and about 
where and how they are likely to access and use those tools.”72 Hagan’s analysis 
focuses on making sure that technical access to justice innovations, such as online 
case management systems, online e-filing portals, legal information websites, chat 
portals, and hotlines actually meet the needs, abilities, and proclivities of intended 
users.73 She argues that approaching access to justice problems from a design 
perspective has a number of important advantages: 
[It] allows legal organizations to be more intentional about how they spend 
resources. It empowers community members to help in deciding how 
funding, technology, and staff time are used in reforming the legal system. 
It can be a source of promising ideas for innovations and community 
partnerships, and it can harness stakeholders to help make the system work 
better for people it is supposed to serve.74  
Hagan details the ways in which labs, courses, workshops, and other methods 
can be used to expose law students to design thinking.75 Others have begun 
importing design thinking into various legal education contexts to enhance law 
students’ development as problem solvers. For example, the James E. Rogers 
College of Law at the University of Arizona offers multiple courses through its 
Innovation for Justice Lab, which focuses on “empower[ing] students to design and 
launch solutions to the justice gap.”76 Maine Law School’s Apps for Justice Project 
enabled the development of web-based applications that enable the state’s residents 
to address certain justiciable problems, such as tenants’ legal needs and the 
resolution of basic family law matters.77 The project used design thinking as the core 
of legal application development, which forced participants “to address the 
fundamental question of how human-centered design can solve problems, uncover 
new ideas, and make law more accessible, usable, and engaging.”78 The team 
included legal service providers, private attorneys, law students, clinical instructors, 
as well as input from prospective clients about their comfort with technology and 
their emotional reactions to specific legal matters.79 Rather than merely offering free 
 
72. Margaret Hagan, Participatory Design for Innovation in Access to Justice, 148 DÆDALUS, 
Winter 2019, at 120, 120. 
73. Id. at 121–25. 
74. Id. at 125–26. 
75. Margaret Hagan, Design Comes to the Law School, in MODERNISING LEGAL EDUCATION 
109, 115–18 (Catrina Denvir ed., 2020). 
76. Curriculum: Innovation for Justice, UNIV. ARIZ., JAMES E. ROGERS COLL. L., https://
law.arizona.edu/innovation-for-justice-curriculum [https://perma.cc/498L-MUJB] ( last visited  
Dec. 17, 2020). 
77. Lois R. Lupica, Tobias A. Franklin & Sage M. Friedman, The Apps for Justice  
Project: Employing Design Thinking to Narrow the Access to Justice Gap, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1363 (2017). 
78. Id. at 1376. 
79. Id. at 1376–77. 
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or low-cost legal services that represented lawyers’ understanding of the justiciable 
problems Maine residents faced, the Apps for Justice Project recognized that “[t]he 
key to application of design theory is to make the design of systems  
human-centered. . . . Further, the team recognized that addressing a person’s mental 
state when that person is faced with a high-stakes legal problem is also essential to 
the app’s utility.”80  
To date, much of the work that has explicitly connected design thinking and 
access to justice has centered around technological development.81 However, the 
concepts that underlie design thinking have a vaster reach and a broader application 
to justice problems. This broader application is important since, as Tanina Rostain 
points out, there are significant real-world barriers to people’s adoption of  
tech-based tools to address their legal problems, particularly among people who are 
living in poverty,82 as well as those living in rural areas.83 Teaching design thinking 
in law school has to go well beyond the development of new legal tech tools. 
Everything from trial preparation84 to contract drafting85 could benefit from the 
incorporation of design thinking.86 These encompass access to justice goals, but 
would benefit lawyers in other areas of practice, from copyright87 to corporate law88 
to law firm management.89 Albeit a relatively new introduction to the world of legal 
education, design thinking is already taught in business, medicine, engineering, and 
other professions to enable new professionals to think creatively, act efficiently, and 
 
80. Id. at 1382. Another model of technological innovation is Staudt and Medieros’s Access to 
Justice and Technology Clinic. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Afterword, in MODERNISING LEGAL 
EDUCATION, supra note 75, at 258  (citing Ronald W. Staudt & Andrew P. Medeiros, Access to Justice 
and Technology Clinics: A 4% Solution, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 695 (2013)). 
81. E.g., Sari Graben, Teaching Emerging Technologies as Legal Systems: Proposals for a Changing 
Law School Curriculum, OSGOODE HALL L.J. (forthcoming 2021); Dan Jackson, Human-Centered Legal 
Tech: Integrating Design in Legal Education, 50 LAW TCHR. 82 (2016). 
82. Tanina Rostain, Techno-Optimism & Access to the Legal System, 148 DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, 
at 93. 
83. COLBY LEIGH RACHFAL & ANGELE A. GILROY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30719, 
BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS AND THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: FEDERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
(2019). As the FCC’s 2020 Broadband Deployment Report noted, rural areas and Tribal lands continue 
to disproportionately lack access to adequate Internet services. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, FCC  
20-50, 2020 BROADBAND DEPLOYMENT REPORT (2020).  
84. Ctr. on the Legal Pro., Harvard L. Sch., Designs on the Law: The Arrival of Design Thinking 
in the Legal Profession, 5 ADAPTIVE INNOVATION, Jan.–Feb. 2019, https://
thepractice.law.harvard.edu/article/designs-on-the-law/ [https://perma.cc/CHN4-4MW9]. 
85. Helena Haapio & Margaret Hagan, Design Patterns for Contracts, JUSLETTER IT (2016). 
86. For a broad discussion of design thinking’s application to legal practice and beyond, see 
Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Legal Design for Practice, Activism, Policy, and Research, 46 J.L. & SOC’Y  
185 (2019). 
87. Consider, for example, Rebecca Tushnet’s proposition for rethinking our assessment of 
visual images within copyright doctrine. See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of 
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683 (2012). 
88. Jay A. Mitchell, Putting Some Product into Work-Product: Corporate Lawyers Learning from 
Designers, 12 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2015). 
89. Mark Szabo, Design Thinking in Legal Practice Management, DESIGN MGMT. INST. REV., 
Sept. 2010, at 44. 
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understand the perspective of those whose needs they are learning to serve. In 
addition to providing legal services, lawyers could benefit from thinking more 
effectively about how to market legal services to people who do not currently seek 
them out.90 
Note, too, that design thinking’s emphasis on user experience and 
participatory design dovetails with legal consciousness. Design thinking and legal 
consciousness both emphasize the importance of knowing how nonlawyers think 
about, and interact with, law. Neither legal consciousness nor design thinking 
should replace traditional legal reasoning or legal writing, but both would be 
tremendously useful additions to the core curriculum. Law students should not be 
merely offered opportunities to incorporate versatile modalities of thinking into their 
curricula;91 rather, versatile modes of thinking should be required components of 
legal education.92 For most practitioners, these versatile modalities are required parts 
of being a good lawyer. 
III. IMPARTING A BROADER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROFESSION’S ROLE IN 
SOLVING JUSTICIABLE PROBLEMS 
In law school, it makes sense that we teach lawyers to distinguish legally 
cognizable problems from noncognizable ones. Law students are training to be 
lawyers, and there is a discrete set of problems about which lawyers, and only 
lawyers, are permitted to take particular actions. But for legal education to meet the 
needs of the access to justice crisis, we need to take legal education beyond this 
reactive, law-centric model. Yes, law students must learn to identify legally 
cognizable problems. Clinics are already doing this and doing it well. Practicing 
lawyers consistently report that clinics were their most useful educational 
experiences in law school,93 partly because clinics help them think about diagnosing 
legal problems and developing concrete strategies to solve them.94 The standard 
 
90. Elizabeth Chambliss, Marketing Legal Assistance, 148 DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 98 
(discussing ways to expand access to justice by marketing legal solutions to everyday people more 
effectively and arguing that significant innovations are possible even within the constraints of current 
professional rules). 
91. As I will discuss in greater depth, infra Part V, making something into an elective sends the 
message that it is non-essential. 
92. Though not a topic to dwell upon in this Article, it is worth noting that these kinds of 
reforms might prompt reflection on various types of existing implicit and explicit law school hierarchies, 
including those between clinical and doctrinal instructors and those between various intersections of 
law and the social sciences. 
93. RONIT DINOVITZER, BRYANT G. GARTH, RICHARD SANDER, JOYCE STERLING & GITA 
Z. WILDER, THE NALP FOUND. FOR L. CAREER RSCH. & EDUC. & AM. BAR FOUND., AFTER THE 
JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 81 tbl.11.1 (2004). However, as an 
empirical matter, it is important to note that it is unclear whether there is a connection between a law 
student’s participation in clinical legal education in law school and later involvement in pro bono or 
public service activities. Rebecca Sandefur & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Effect, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 57, 
82 (2009). 
94. YOUNG, supra note 31, at 202. 
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classroom setting could incorporate these approaches, focusing more on  
problem-solving and distributive justice.95  
For lawyers to have a role in solving the access to justice crisis, we need to 
teach law students as much as we can about the ecosystem of justiciable problems, 
where lawyers fit into this ecosystem, when lawyers are and are not useful to 
everyday people, and how to partner with other actors in the ecosystem—as 
opposed to training them to focus solely on the narrow legal problem in front  
of them.  
A. The Ecosystem of Justiciable Problems  
For decades, legal scholarship, bar associations, and sociolegal scholars 
assumed that the most significant barrier to people’s pursuit of civil legal solutions 
was a lack of funds to hire an attorney or a shortage of available attorneys practicing 
in the areas where people need them most.96 Given these assumptions, it made sense 
to address the access to justice crisis by producing more attorneys and making these 
attorneys accessible to everyday people. Innovations such as civil Gideon initiatives97 
are potentially very useful in resolving people’s justice problems, since it remains 
true that not everyone who would like to retain a lawyer is able to do so, particularly 
for certain problems, and in certain parts of the United States.98  
But as Sandefur’s research illuminates, a dearth of money and available 
attorneys are not, in fact, the largest obstacles to people’s resolution of their 
justiciable problems.99 Everyday people who experience justiciable civil legal 
problems do not think about them in legal terms at all, nor do they tend to attribute 
 
95. Deborah Rhode has written: “Relatively few law schools offer specialized courses focusing 
on issues related to access to justice and the topic is missing or marginal in the traditional core 
curriculum.” Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: An Agenda for Legal Education and Research, 62  
J. LEGAL EDUC. 531, 545 (2013) [hereinafter Rhode, An Agenda for Legal Education ]. 
96. See, e.g., Mary Helen McNeal, Toward a “Civil Gideon” Under the Montana  
Constitution: Parental Rights as the Starting Point, 66 MONT. L. REV. 81, 81 (2005) (“[B]ut many low or 
moderate income individuals cannot secure free legal assistance and cannot afford to hire lawyers.”); 
Sweet, supra note 1, at 503 (“With 36.5 million people at the poverty level in 1996 and 77.45 million 
with incomes below $50,000 in 1993, legal services are realistically beyond the reach of many.”). 
97. See, e.g., Russell Engler, Toward a Context-Based Civil Right to Counsel Through “Access to 
Justice” Initiatives, 40 CLEARHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 196 (2006); Sweet, supra note 1; 
Leber, supra note 1; McNeal, supra note 96. 
98. See, e.g., Leber, supra note 1, at 25 (“[T]he Office of Court Administration estimated that 
seventy-three percent of litigants in New York City Family Court and ninety-three percent in Housing 
Court appeared without an attorney in matters involving fundamental issues such as evictions, domestic 
violence, child custody, guardianship, visitation, support, and paternity. Sixty percent of pro se litigants 
surveyed, with annual incomes ranging from under $15,000 to more than $45,000, believed they could 
not afford an attorney.”); Pruitt et al., supra note 63. 
99. SANDEFUR, ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA, supra note 4, at 3 (“When 
people who did not seek any assistance from third parties outside their social circles were asked if cost 
was one barrier to doing so, they reported that concerns about cost were a factor in 17% of cases. A 
more important reason that people do not seek assistance with these situations, in particular assistance 
from lawyers or courts, is that they do not understand these situations to be legal.”). 
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a problem’s existence to a failure of law or an absence of law.100 And since they do 
not see law, per se, as the problem, they are unlikely to seek out legal aid lawyers as 
the solution.101 The mere existence of on-the-books legal remedies fails to empower 
people to pursue solutions to rights violations.102 
In addition to shedding light on everyday people’s relationship to their civil 
justice problems, research has sketched out a basic picture of the justice landscape 
more generally. For example, a 2013 study of twelve categories of civil justice 
problems found that low-income and poor people experience these problems more 
frequently than others do, and that the vast majority of the time, people pursue no 
legal remedy even for the most readily solvable justiciable problems.103 A 2017 
report from the Legal Services Corporation found that one in four low-income 
households experienced six or more civil justice problems in the past year.104 Access 
to justice problems have severe long-term ramifications, resulting in “negative 
impacts on physical and mental health, being harassed, assaulted or threatened, fear, 
loss of confidence, loss of income, and damage to relationships.”105 These negative 
consequences of civil justice problems fall disproportionately on the shoulders of 
low-income people and people of color.106 Research also shows that certain 
populations, such as military veterans and victims of domestic violence, are more 
likely to face civil justice problems—even problems ostensibly unrelated to their 
status as a veteran or a domestic violence victim.107 Rural residents, too, face 
particular challenges to resolution of their justice problems. That population’s most 
persistent obstacles include a lack of public transit to sources of aid and a lack of 
technological infrastructure to access alternative solutions.108 And some justice 
problems are exacerbated by the co-occurrence of others; for example, civil justice 
problems can result from interaction with the criminal justice system, even for 
 
100. Id.; see also Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing, supra note 4, at 3. 
101. Indeed, many of Greene’s respondents incorrectly believed that they were entitled to free 
legal help for their civil legal problems but still did not pursue any kind of legal solution. Greene, supra 
note 22, at 1290. The barriers, as discussed, supra, had to do with the ways that they thought about their 
problems and about the legal system. This underscores the degree to which the ecosystem approach I 
propose dovetails with teaching law students about legal consciousness. 
102. Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming 
System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2008); John G. Levi & David M. Rubenstein, Introduction, 148 DÆDALUS, 
Winter 2019, at 7; Calvin Morrill, Karolyn Tyson, Lauren B. Edelman & Richard Arum, Legal 
Mobilization in Schools: The Paradox of Rights and Race Among Youth, 44 LAW & SOC’Y  
REV. 651 (2010). 
103. Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing, supra note 4, at 9.  
104. LSC, supra note 6. 
105. Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing, supra note 4, at 9. 
106. Lincoln Caplan, The Invisible Justice Problem, 148 DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 19; 
SANDEFUR, ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA, supra note 4, at 16. 
107. LSC, supra note 6. 
108. Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 23. Indeed, Haksgaard has made a compelling argument that 
in many situations, rural private practice should be understood and reconceptualized as public interest 
work, and that loan forgiveness programs should be expanded to encompass a broader view of public 
interest, given the services rural lawyers perform. Hannah Haksgaard, Rural Practice as Public Interest 
Work, 71 ME. L. REV. 209 (2019). 
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people who face no criminal charges.109 These are all important parts of the civil 
justice ecosystem. 
Yet despite these strides in mapping access to justice, for the most part we 
train law students in the classroom as if these advancements have not occurred at 
all (again, the proliferation of clinical legal education notwithstanding110). That is, 
we implicitly teach law students that the way to solve people’s civil justice problems 
is to build lots of law offices and wait for people to walk into them. But if we want 
lawyers to learn how to be active solvers of justice problems, as opposed to passively 
addressing the tip-of-the-iceberg111 problems that materialize in their offices 
someday, we need to teach them about legal problems as an ecosystem, wherein 
some problems grow slowly and others quickly, wherein some problems tend to 
beget others, and wherein legal action is one possible intervention among many. 
Instead of an approach that asks, “How can we best match lawyers to all the legal 
problems in the world,” the ecosystem approach would ask, “How can lawyers be 
most useful in helping people live their lives unencumbered by justice problems?”  
Approaching civil justice as an ecosystem is different from the typical law 
school approach for at least three reasons. First, it suggests that lawyers have a 
responsibility to make proactive, not simply reactive, interventions in the access to 
justice crisis. Second, it encourages lawyers to think about a given justice problem 
not as an isolated legal issue, but as part of a network of the interrelated problems 
a person encounters in everyday life. Third, it suggests that lawyers should think of 
their role beyond legal problem-solving and conceive of themselves partly as 
“community connectors” who—as former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert  
H. Jackson put it— “understand[ ] the structure of society and how its groups 
interlock and interact.”112 Nor would the ecosystem approach supplant traditional 
doctrinal courses. Instead, it would supplement and contextualize the traditional 
model of lawyering we already teach, helping the next generation of lawyers think 
 
109. See ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS A PUNISHMENT 
FOR THE POOR (2016); ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR 
MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL 
(2018); Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM  
L. REV. 1913 (2007). 
110. See Drew & Morriss, supra note 12; Chambliss, supra note 80.  
111. Sandefur, Access to What?, supra note 2, at 50. 
112. David F. Levi, Dana Remus & Abigail Frisch, Reclaiming the Role of Lawyers as Community 
Connectors, 148 DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 30, 31 (citing Robert H. Jackson, The County Seat Lawyer, 
36 A.B.A. J. 497 (1950)). The authors write:  
Regarding access to justice, the legal profession can produce lawyers and judges who have a 
day-to-day understanding of the entire range of social life in a community. . . . These lawyers 
can better understand what it means to be poor or disabled or a member of a minority group 
and, at the same time, can understand how aggregations of power and wealth are organized 
and motivated in business, government, and elsewhere. They can put this broad knowledge 
and experience to good use in solving difficult and recurring social problems for the benefit 
of individuals and the community.  
Id. at 32. 
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about pursuing justice, not simply about identifying the legally actionable 
components within a complex situation.  
Understanding the civil justice ecosystem requires a careful assessment of 
lawyers’ own role in the system. This includes understanding clients’ perceptions of 
particular types of interventions (relating, again, to legal consciousness), knowing 
when to deploy extralegal interventions, and understanding which interventions 
make the most (or least) difference to client satisfaction and substantive outcomes. 
Knowing something about when lawyers do and do not matter can help lawyers 
direct their efforts toward places where they are likely to make a difference, and 
away from places where they are not likely to do so, perhaps relegating the latter 
category to other types of actors. For example, a study of the impact of legal 
representation on tenants in housing court showed that legal representation 
mattered a great deal to case outcomes, regardless of the legal merits of the case.113 
A meta-analysis of studies of lawyers’ effect on case outcomes revealed that 
“lawyers’ impact comes more from managing relatively simple legal procedures than 
from deploying the complex legal theories or doctrines that are the stuff of formal 
legal education . . . . Lawyers’ impact also reflects their relationship to the court as 
professionals who understand how to navigate a rarefied interpersonal world.”114 
In other words, lawyers tend to be especially good at helping people navigate 
procedures that the lawyers themselves view as relatively simple. Lawyers are also 
good at ensuring that that courts do not become haphazard about following rules.115 
The lawyerly roles that matter most are a good deal more prosaic than, for example, 
specialized substantive legal expertise, which turns out to make less of a difference 
to case outcomes than one might expect.116 Understanding the importance of this 
relational expertise117 to clients may help law students think strategically about the 
skills they wish to develop during law school. Indeed, practicing lawyers report 
wishing that they had devoted more time to relational skill development in law 
school, including developing the ability to work effectively with clients and 
opposing counsel.118  
 
113. Carroll Seron, Martin R. Frankel, Gregg Van Ryzin & Jean Kovath, The Impact of Legal 
Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized 
Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 419 (2001); see also Emily S. Taylor Poppe & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 
Do Lawyers Matter? The Effect of Legal Representation in Civil Disputes, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 881,  
900–10 (2016). 
114. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise: Understanding Relational and 
Substantive Expertise Through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 AM. SOCIO. REV. 909, 926 (2015) (citing WILLIAM 
M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD BOND & LEE S. SCHULMAN, 
EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007)). 
115. Id. at 910. 
116. Id.  
117. Id. at 909; see also Stephen R. Barley, Technicians in the Workplace: Ethnographic Evidence 
for Bringing Work into Organizational Studies, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 404 (1996). 
118. Young, Original Survey Results, supra note 46. 
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B. Other Actors in the Ecosystem  
Teaching lawyers about the civil justice ecosystem includes educating them 
about the root causes of justice problems. Shanahan and Carpenter argue that doing 
so will encourage the legal profession to hold government actors accountable for 
lapses in social safety nets that have caused the proliferation of justice problems. 
They write: 
Any change must begin with courts and lawyers refusing to blindly accept 
the courts as a last resort against the legislative and executive branches’ 
failures to address inequality. . . . It is in the profession’s self-interest and 
consistent with lawyers’ role as stewards of law and justice to . . . advocate 
for courts doing less of what they are not well-suited to do and more of 
what they are.119  
In addition to teaching law students how the modern civil justice ecosystem 
emerged, it is crucial to teach them how to work effectively within it. This includes 
knowing not just about the landscape of problems, but about the nonlawyer 
professionals, volunteers, community members, and others who are part of it and 
have—or could have—a role in identifying and remedying civil justice problems. It 
also includes knowing about the justice landscape beyond one’s own practice area. 
A study by Sudeall and Richardson, for example, details numerous practical 
opportunities for civil justice intervention for people who are represented by public 
defenders, and explains how the siloing of criminal and civil practice is an 
underrecognized barrier to access to justice goals.120 
One important category of resources comprises nonlawyer legal professionals, 
such as paralegals and limited license legal technicians, who can perform certain 
services usually performed by lawyers, but at lower cost.121 Law students are not 
generally taught about the roles nonlawyer legal professionals play in the legal 
system (besides the boundaries of the unauthorized practice of law), which ill-equips 
them to think critically or creatively about how the legal profession’s structure 
influences the resolution of particular types of justice problems, or about which 
restrictions on the practice of law are or are not ethically advantageous to various 
client populations. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that practicing lawyers are 
ill informed about how to work with limited license legal practitioners. They tend 
to approach such programs with skepticism about competition, as opposed to an 
eye toward collaboration, especially among small-firm lawyers and solo 
practitioners.122 Nonetheless, these service providers have significant potential to 
 
119. Shanahan & Carpenter, supra note 16, at 133. 
120. Lauren Sudeall & Ruth Richardson, Unfamiliar Justice: Indigent Criminal Defendants’ 
Experiences with Civil Justice Needs, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2105 (2019).  
121. For example, Washington State’s Limited License Legal Technician program was designed 
to aid people with family law problems. THOMAS M. CLARKE & REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, NAT’L  
CTR. FOR STATE CTS. & AM. BAR FOUND., PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE WASHINGTON 
STATE LIMITED LICENSE LEGAL TECHNICIAN PROGRAM (2017). 
122. Mary Juetten, The Limited License Legal Technician Is the Way of the Future of Law,  
A.B.A. J. (Dec. 8, 2017, 8:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/the_limited_license_ 
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expand the delivery of services in the access to justice space.123 Members of state 
bar organizations will be called upon to weigh in about regulation and 
certification,124 and a few initiatives, such as the Utah Implementation Task Force 
on Regulatory Reform, have been spearheaded by attorneys—in Utah’s case, the 
State Supreme Court.125 New lawyers need tools to think carefully about how to 
incorporate nonlawyer legal practitioners into the profession; increasingly, they will 
be called upon to do precisely this.126 As Chambliss points out, most legal 
profession courses are behind the curve in this regard and devote little or no 
attention to the most pressing regulatory debates, focusing on existing rules without 
discussing the empirical assumptions that underpin them.127 Yet, “[l]aw students 
need to be exposed to these debates if they are to act as competent stewards of the 
profession over the course of their careers,”128 and in the access to justice context, 
these debates are more important than ever.129 
Some nonlawyer volunteers are promising access to justice partners as well. 
For example, the volunteers in New York City’s Court Navigator program assume 
a variety of roles, including helping courthouse visitors figure out where to go, 
 
legal_technician_story_start_with_why [https://perma.cc/5CY2-E52F]; see, e.g., Christopher Coble, 
No More Lawyers? CA Bar Endorses Legal Technicians, Legal Tech, FINDLAW: STRATEGIST ( July 10, 
2019, 2:07 PM), https://blogs.findlaw.com/strategist/2019/07/no-more-lawyers-ca-bar-endorses-
legal-technicians-legal-tech.html [https://perma.cc/TWV3-GCTU]. For a discussion about the 
impacts of various aspects of deregulation on access to justice, see generally Milan Markovic, Juking 
Access to Justice to Deregulate the Legal Market, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 63 (2016). 
123. REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & THOMAS M. CLARKE, AM. BAR FOUND. & NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE CTS., INCREASING ACCESS TO JUSTICE THROUGH EXPANDED “ROLES BEYOND LAWYERS”: 
PRELIMINARY EVALUATION AND CLASSIFICATION FRAMEWORKS (2015); see also Benjamin P. Cooper, 
Access to Justice Without Lawyers, 47 AKRON L. REV. 205, 217–21 (2014). But cf. Rebecca  
M. Donaldson, Law by Non-Lawyers: The Limit to Limited License Legal Technicians Increasing Access 
to Justice, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2018) (arguing “that the LLLT model is not designed to increase 
access to justice for those from low-income populations”). 
124. For a discussion of how this works in several different states, see Lori W. Nelson,  
LLLT—Limited License Legal Technician: What It Is, What It Isn’t, and the Grey Area in Between, 50 
FAM. L.Q. 447, 448–68 (2016). For thoughtful structural cautions about nonlawyer representation 
programs, see generally Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Can a Little 
Representation Be a Dangerous Thing?, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1367 (2016). 
125. See UTAH LEGAL REGULATORY REFORM: BASIC FACTS, https://www.utahbar.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/05/UTAH-Communications-Fact-Sheet-FINAL.pdf  [https://perma.cc/ 
LF6K-RWGU] ( last visited Jan. 22, 2021). 
126. For examples of the types of evaluative frameworks that would be useful to lawyers in 
thinking about the roles of non-lawyer legal professionals, see generally Rebecca L. Sandefur & Thomas 
Clarke, Designing the Competition: A Future of Roles Beyond Lawyers? The Case of the USA, 67 
HASTINGS L.J. 1467 (2016). 
127. Elizabeth Chambliss, Evidence-Based Lawyer Regulation, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 297,  
341–43 (2019). 
128. Id. at 341–42. 
129. Presumably, law schools will also have some role in training LLLTs and other non-lawyer 
legal practitioners, and it will be incumbent on us to figure out what that relationship should look like. 
“Law school clinics are also a natural setting for introducing students to evidence-based program 
assessment and the value and limits of different methods of measuring the impact of legal assistance.” 
Id. at 343. 
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present the correct documents, and answer a judge’s factual questions about their 
case.130 For example, one branch of the New York City Court Navigators Program 
is the Housing Court Answers Navigators Pilot Project, which is situated in the 
Brooklyn Housing Court.131 Volunteers help tenants write a response to a landlord’s 
petition for unpaid rent, asserting defenses to nonpayment.132 An evaluation of that 
program found that volunteers were helpful in several ways, helping tenants 
articulate defenses (“litigants assisted by [volunteer navigators] asserted more than 
twice as many defenses as litigants who received no assistance”), explain their 
circumstances to judges (“tenants assisted by a [volunteer navigator] were 87 
percent more likely than unassisted tenants to have their defenses recognized and 
addressed by the court”), and to obtain redress from neglectful landlords (“judges 
ordered landlords to make needed repairs about 50 percent more often in 
Navigator-assisted cases”).133 These functions are fairly simple, but their impact is 
impressive, particularly in courts as busy and crowded as New York City’s. 
Numerous other jurisdictions, such as Baltimore City District Court, are 
experimenting with similar initiatives, and programs such as the Illinois JusticeCorps 
have involved college students in court navigation.134 There is a particular need to 
understand how these programs would work in rural areas, which suffer 
disproportionately from lawyer deficits,135 and whose residents may have very 
different orientations toward the law than do residents of more densely populated 
counties.136 Lawyers, who operate daily in the court system and understand its 
contours, are well suited to support nonlawyer volunteer programs and spearhead 
 
130. Fern Fisher, Navigating the New York Courts with the Assistance of a Non-Lawyer, 122 
DICK. L. REV. 825, 829 (2018). See also Court Navigator, N.Y.C. SERV., https://www.nycservice.org/
opportunities/9186 [https://perma.cc/A68G-PCMM] ( last visited Dec. 17, 2020), for a description 
of a court navigator in New York City. 
131. REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & THOMAS M. CLARKE, AM. BAR FOUND. & NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE CTS., ROLES BEYOND LAWYERS: SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESEARCH REPORT 
OF AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY COURT NAVIGATORS PROGRAM AND ITS THREE 
PILOT PROJECTS 4 (2016). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Court Navigator Pilot Project, UNIV. BALT., http://www.ubalt.edu/academics/prelaw/
court-navigator-pilot-project.cfm [https://perma.cc/REG6-LQ4V] ( last visited Aug. 29, 2020); 
Illinois JusticeCorps, ILL. BAR FOUND., https://www.illinoisbarfoundation.org/illinois-justicecorps 
[https://perma.cc/8VFA-SJLD] ( last visited Aug. 29, 2020). 
135. See generally Pruitt et al., supra note 23. And the problem is growing. For example, in Illinois, 
fifty-two counties admitted fewer than five lawyers in the last five years. Ninety-five of the state’s 
counties share just ten percent of its lawyers. Mark C. Palmer, The Disappearing Rural Lawyer, 
2CIVILITY (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.2civility.org/the-disappearing-rural-lawyer/ [https:// 
perma.cc/YX96-SZJ3 ]. 
136. See generally Pruitt et al., supra note 23. Anthropologist Michele Statz makes a compelling 
argument that many existing access-to-justice solutions are implicitly urbanormative and either fail to 
address rural Americans’ lived realities or incorporate stereotypes about rural residents. The Rural A2J 
Guide on the Northland Access to Justice Project’s website offers several concrete suggestions for 
working toward rural access to justice in a non-urbanormative way. Michele Statz & Jon Bredeson, 
Concerned About Rural Access to Justice? Start Here First., NORTHLAND ACCESS TO JUST. (2020), 
https://www.northlandproject.org/the-rural-a2j-guide [https://perma.cc/S5LT-3A83]. 
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new ones. Better knowledge of nonlawyers’ capacities to improve civil justice 
outcomes, particularly coupled with the design thinking instruction discussed above, 
holds the potential for lawyers to be transformative and proactive in the access to 
justice crisis. 
Additionally, we can train lawyers to identify nonlegal actors who can aid in 
the identification, resolution, prevention, or recurrence of particular civil justice 
problems. It is critical to teach lawyers how to build and use these networks within 
a justice ecosystem, as opposed to simply telling them that these relationships can 
be important. After all, community norms, structures, and resources vary 
tremendously and effective partners for collaboration are not always obvious. For 
example, a Pew Research report details the ways that different groups approach and 
use library resources differently, suggesting several ways that libraries might be used 
as sites for legal assistance.137 One successful medical clinic partnered with 
barbershops and hair salons to deliver care.138 A community’s racial and cultural 
composition, rurality, literacy, economic health, relationship with local government 
entities, technological infrastructure, and the existence of formal or informal 
community centers will all shape the ways that justice problems might best be 
resolved within that community. For lawyers to have a major role in addressing the 
access to justice crisis, we need them to have a deeper knowledge of the 
communities experiencing the crisis139 and the myriad of nonlegal actors who can 
also work to help solve it. We might imagine teaching law students how to map the 
resources, existing programs, and potential problem-solving allies in a community 
to which they are new—or teaching them how to leverage their existing knowledge 
of a community to solve legal problems in nonobvious ways. 
 
137. Rostain, supra note 82, at 95 (citing JOHN B. HORRIGAN, PEW RSCH. CTR., HOW PEOPLE 
APPROACH FACTS AND INFORMATION (2017), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/14/2017/09/12135404/PI_2017.09.11_FactsAndInfo_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6MP-
KFYM]). For additional discussion of law libraries’ important role in serving access to justice goals, see 
generally AM. ASS’N OF LAW LIBRS., ACCESS TO JUSTICE: BEST PRACTICES FOR PUBLIC LAW 
LIBRARIES (2018), https://www.aallnet.org/gllsis/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2018/01/
scllguide5.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NPZ-77SW]; Thomas Sneed, The Academic Law Library’s Role in 
Cultivating the Rural Lawyer, 64 S.D. L. REV. 213 (2019). 
138. Rostain, supra note 82, at 95 (citing Ronald G. Victor, Kathleen Lynch, Ning Li, Ciantel 
Blyler, Eric Muhammad, Joel Handler, Jeffrey Brettler, Mohamad Rashid, Brent Hsu, Davontae  
Foxx-Drew, Norma Moy & Anthony E. Reid, A Cluster-Randomized Trial of Blood-Pressure Reduction 
in Black Barbershops, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1291 (2018)). 
139. Again, this is another opportunity for standard classroom education and clinical education 
to work in concert. We might imagine expanded models that would foster collaboration between 
lawyers and nonlawyers; indeed, some models for this exist already, such as access to justice clinics that 
partner with community organizations and medical-legal clinics. Problem-solving courts are another 
example of this more holistic approach to justice problems and community resources. Lawyers need to 
be trained to forge new types of relationships within a community for the proactive resolution of civil 
justice problems—something some clinics already emphasize, but which is essentially absent from the 
standard law school classroom. 
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IV. PRODUCING STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT LAWYERS 
To achieve access to justice goals, we need lawyers to come out of law school 
energized: ready to collaborate, tackle complex issues, and create innovative 
approaches to vexing problems. Instead, many of them graduate with poor mental 
health and newfound pessimism about the law. They know more law and may 
“think like lawyers,” but as a group, they are less hopeful, less intrinsically motivated, 
and more risk averse.140 While traditional legal education has anchored the 
profession for more than a century and has innumerable strengths, it is also rife with 
counterproductive pedagogies. As institutions, law schools produce and reproduce 
harmful social structures, and sometimes even demonstrate willful ignorance of 
students’ mental health. If we want to equip professionals to transform access to 
justice, we need them to emerge from law school with the mental fortitude to  
do so. 
Law school needs to be an institution in which every student it admits can 
reach their potential as a member of the legal profession. It needs to be less 
destructive, particularly in the first year, and prepare students for the realities of a 
challenging professional life. In the sections that follow, I make three suggestions 
which, in addition to the other recommendations I have outlined above, would 
produce more resilient lawyers who are better equipped to tackle the access to 
justice crisis.  
First, we need to disrupt the most problematic structural patterns in law 
school, which would benefit law students’ social cognition, mental health, and 
ability to improve as legal thinkers and writers. Second, we need to give law students 
more metacognitive tools—that is, tools for thinking about thinking—to help law 
students understand themselves as legal professionals, contextualize the challenges 
they face in law school, and anticipate the problems they are likely to face in legal 
practice. Third, we need to go beyond teaching law students about the inequalities 
within the legal profession and help them think about how to change or interrupt 
these inequalities. Enabling them to think about the legal profession as something 
evolving and capable of change, as opposed to a stagnant structure they are entering, 
will create a greater sense of self-efficacy among new lawyers. 
A. Dismantling Destructive Patterns in Legal Education 
To the extent that access to justice entails access to lawyers, it must also mean 
access to competent, healthy ones who are psychologically and practically equipped 
to meet client needs. Law students’ mental health problems are an open secret in 
legal education. Anxiety and distress severely disrupt students’ social and intellectual 
lives, and this has been documented since at least the 1960s.141 Comparing law 
 
140. Krieger & Sheldon, What Makes Lawyers Happy?, supra note 26, at 566; Sheldon & Krieger, 
Does Legal Education Have Undermining Effects on Law Students?, supra note 27, at 280–82. 
141. See, e.g., Lawrence Silver, Anxiety and the First Semester of Law School, 4 WIS. L. REV. 1201 
(1968); see also James M. Hedegard, The Impact of Legal Education: An In-Depth Examination of  
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students to similarly situated populations, both in professional school and outside 
of it, reveals significantly higher rates of depression and psychological distress 
among law students.142 The Survey of Law Student Well-Being (SLSWB) looked in 
depth at students attending fifteen U.S. law schools and found that the rate of 
clinical anxiety among law students was about one in three, the rate of clinical 
depression was one in six, and one in ten had engaged in physical self-harm in the 
past year.143 Nor are law students themselves unaware of the effects law school has 
on them. My own mixed-methods study of law students at over 100 U.S. law schools 
revealed student responses consistent with the SLSWB results.144 They pointed to 
depression, anxiety, and personality changes. They said things like, “Law school has 
made me into the worst version of myself,” and “Sudden bouts of sadness and 
depression were something I never experienced before law school.”145 
In 2014, the Yale Law School Mental Health Alliance found that seven in ten 
students experienced some form of mental health challenge in law school, but that 
most sought no help even when their academic and social lives suffered, in large 
part because they were afraid of the stigma associated with seeking help.146 Other 
research has found that stigma is particularly a deterrent for students from poor and 
working-class backgrounds.147 At minimum, law schools need to encourage  
help-seeking behavior among law students, normalize multiple types of help 
seeking, and give students concrete strategies for doing so. Indeed, a common 
theme among the 250 law school alumni I surveyed was a sense of regret that they 
had not sought more help while they were still in law school.148 And a common 
theme among current law students was a sense of alienation that they related to 
innumerable factors, including gender identity or gender presentation, sexual 
orientation, conservative political leanings, liberal political leanings, religious 
affiliation, disability, mental health diagnosis, social class background, familial 
background, military background, or any one of innumerable characteristics that 
 
Career-Relevant Interests, Attitudes, and Personality Traits Among First-Year Law Students, 4 AM. BAR 
FOUND. RSCH. J. 791, 835–38 (1979). 
142. G. Andrew H. Benjamin, Alfred Kaszniak, Bruce Sales & Stephen B. Shanfield, The Role 
of Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers, 11 AM. BAR 
FOUND. RSCH. J. 225, 225–33 (1986); Matthew M. Dammeyer & Narina Nunez, Anxiety and Depression 
Among Law Students: Current Knowledge and Future Directions, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 55,  
55–67 (1999). 
143. Organ et al., supra note 35, at 136–39.  Possible alcohol abuse and prescription drug use 
were rampant as well: one in four and one in seven, respectively. Id. at 128–36. 
144. YOUNG, supra note 31. 
145. Young, Original Survey Results, supra note 46. 
146. JESSIE AGATSTEIN, ZACH ARNOLD, RACHEL DEMPSEY, JOYA SONNENFELDT & JOSH 
WEISS, YALE L. SCH. MENTAL HEALTH ALL., FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS: A REPORT ON 
MENTAL HEALTH AT YALE LAW SCHOOL 3–4 (2014). 
147. Katie R. Billings & Kathryne M. Young, How Cultural Capital Shapes Mental Health 
Disparities on College Campuses (Jan. 2, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
148. A handful of law schools have been proactive in this regard, retaining a full-time 
psychologist as part of the law school staff. Unfortunately, this approach remains relatively unusual. 
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distinguished them from the majority of their law school peers.149 Even students 
for whom these characteristics had never been particularly salient before law school 
found them salient during law school. They described a “cliquish” or  
“high-school-like” atmosphere that “discourages showing any sign of weakness,” 
“takes mental tolls you don’t expect,” and creates a tremendous amount of pressure 
to make it seem to their peers as if they are doing fine.150 The following excerpts 
from law students I surveyed represent the character of these kinds of responses: 
The summer before 1L began, I read several books about how to succeed 
in law school and what to expect in my first year. None of these books, 
however, prepared me for the loneliness, the feeling of isolation, and the 
pressure that accompanies the law school experience. To my classmates, 
I’m sure I appear happy and fine. That is because, at school, I pretend that 
I am.151 
For me, the academic expectations and the workload were not a problem. 
However, the feeling of alienation, needing to hide who I am and censor 
what information about my life I let slip was extremely stressful. To the 
point where I needed to take a quarter off to focus exclusively on 
maintaining my mental health.152 
Given the pervasiveness of anxiety, depression, and general dissatisfaction, 
some law schools have taken steps outside the classroom to provide law students 
with additional mental health support. Some law schools, such as the UC Davis 
School of Law, retain a full-time psychologist who provides law students direct 
mental health support.153 Unfortunately, more institutions have taken a piecemeal 
approach, directing students to university health care centers that specialize in 
undergraduate mental health, or bringing in a psychologist for limited amounts of 
time, such as a few days a month, for one-time appointments with students in 
distress.154 Even worse, many law students have a legitimate concern that seeking 
help may require them to disclose personal mental health information on the 
character and fitness portion of their state bar exam.155 Thus, the reasons law 
 
149. See generally YOUNG, supra note 31. 
150. Young, Original Survey Results, supra note 46.  
151. Id. This student was a 1L who identifies as Middle Eastern, attended a top-100 law school, 
and was the first in her family to pursue a law degree. 
152. Id.. This student was a white joint-degree student at a top-100 law school whose parents 
held professional degrees and who had lawyers in her family. 
153. See Wellness, U.C. DAVIS SCH. L., https://law.ucdavis.edu/student-affairs/wellness.html 
[https://perma.cc/72ZV-H9S6] ( last visited Nov. 2, 2020). 
154. Karen Sloan, Law Schools Tackle Mental Health, LAW.COM (May 9, 2016, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202757012950/Schools-Tackle-Mental-Health/
?slreturn=20201003132123 [https://perma.cc/2EM4-VCBP]. 
155. Margaret Hannon & Scott Hiers, Law Students, Law Schools Lead Efforts to Remove Mental 
Health Questions from Character & Fitness Equation, A.B.A. FOR L. STUDENTS: STUDENT LAW. BLOG 
(Oct. 9, 2019), https://abaforlawstudents.com/2019/10/09/law-students-law-schools-mental-health-
character-and-fitness/ [https://perma.cc/V69Q-G6D5]. Unfortunately, counterparts to these 
formal and informal barriers to seeking help exist in other high-stress professions as well, such as 
regulatory and workplace barriers for doctors who specialize in surgeries. See Charles M. Balch, Julie  
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students are unlikely to seek mental health help are not just personal, but social  
and structural. 
The ever-present anxiety students face is compounded by its cultural—and, I 
would argue—structural normalization. A number of law students I interviewed said 
that they were so used to being anxious and overwhelmed that during the few times 
they were not suffering from anxiety, they became anxious that they were not 
working hard enough. As I will argue below, everything from the grading structure 
to the frontloading of doctrinal courses contributes to the normalization of anxiety. 
From the beginning, law school prizes toughness, resilience, and analytical rigor. 
Simply reminding students to get enough sleep and exercise, while frontloading so 
much of law school and giving students little opportunity for guided practice in their 
first year, as I discuss below, sends the message that if they fail to suck it up, they 
might not “have what it takes.” This idea is related to what Sturm calls the 
“gladiator” model of legal education, which values competition over  
problem-solving.156 Sturm makes a persuasive case that this model is not only 
counterproductive to training lawyers but deeply gendered as well—a framework 
that Knize, former Editor-in-Chief of the UC Davis Law Review, takes up in her 
nuanced analysis of the ways the gladiator model manifests within the social context 
of law review membership.157 
In addition to stigmatizing help-seeking and providing insufficient support for 
the enormous number of law students who need it, law schools have done little to 
curb structural sources of law student anxiety. Tolstoy famously wrote that all happy 
families look alike, but that all unhappy families are unhappy in their own way. In 
my own study of law students, I expected to find something similar—that the 
unhappiest law students would all be unhappy for idiosyncratic reasons. But this 
turned out not to be so. The corrosive anxiety law students experience comes from 
a few main sources.  
One of these, to which I just alluded, is the structure of grading and  
exams—the “winner-take-all” model wherein one final (or, if a student is 
“fortunate,” one final and one midterm) determines a student’s entire semester 
grade—grades which, if unimpressive, can immediately exclude them from 
prestigious opportunities such as clerkships, law review membership, or certain 
summer jobs. As Carol Dweck and other social psychologists have shown, the most 
effective learners are those who cultivate a “growth” mindset rather than a “fixed” 
one.158 Growth-mindset learners believe in their own capacity for improvement. 
 
A. Freischlag & Tait D. Shanafelt, Stress and Burnout Among Surgeons: Understanding and Managing the 
Syndrome and Avoiding the Adverse Consequences, 144 ARCHIVES SURGERY 371, 372 (2009). 
156. See generally Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations 
About Women, the Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 119 (1997). 
157. Megan S. Knize, The Pen Is Mightier: Rethinking the “Gladiator” Ethos of Student-Edited 
Law Reviews, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 309, 325–31 (2013). 
158. CAROL S. DWECK, MINDSET: THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF SUCCESS 16–32 (Ballantine 
Books 2007) (2006). 
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They receive a C-minus on a Torts midterm and think, “I need to figure out which 
mistakes I’m making and study harder so that I can become more skilled at analyzing 
Torts questions.” A fixed-mindset learner receives the same grade and thinks, “I’m 
terrible at Torts,” or concludes, “I studied hard and did poorly, so law school grades 
are arbitrary.” Dweck’s work shows that people with a growth mindset are better at 
solving complex problems: they are more persistent and generate cleverer 
solutions.159 But the structure of most 1L courses is practically guaranteed to 
produce fixed-mind-setters. Perhaps most significantly, it incorporates few or no 
opportunities for low-stakes guided practice: chances for law students to try out 
their new skills, receive feedback, adjust their approach and try again, receive more 
feedback, and so on. Guided practice is the most effective way for people to get 
better at just about anything. But the first time a student’s efforts officially “count” 
is usually on the final exam. This structure creates uncertainty about grades, causing 
anxiety, and cultivates a fixed mindset, communicating to law students that the skills 
they have developed over the course of a semester can be boiled down to 
performance on one assessment. Faced with just one or two chances for evaluation 
by an instructor over a fifteen-week semester, it is practically impossible for 
students to escape the conclusion that they are being tested at how inherently 
“smart” or “good” they are at a particular kind of law.  
If we want new lawyers to enter the profession with a growth mindset, and if 
we want to give them opportunities to develop their reasoning with the benefit of 
feedback, we should teach them differently. There are many ways to improve law 
school pedagogy, but perhaps the most obvious example is the use of graded 
problem sets throughout the semester that comprise a significant part of a student’s 
course grade.160 This kind of regular assessment not only helps students focus on 
incremental improvement, reducing anxiety, but narrows achievement gaps in 
higher education161—including the race, gender, and income-based gaps that 
materialize in law school grading.162  
 
159. See generally id. 
160. I have experimented with this structure in a seventy-five-person, law school-style evidence 
course for advanced undergraduates. Students were assigned problem sets every two weeks, which were 
cumulative in the substance they tested. The obvious drawback is that grading problem sets takes a 
good deal of time, even with the help of a teaching assistant. But I realized at least two benefits of this 
approach. First, seeing students grapple with written application of evidence law throughout the 
semester allowed me to calibrate my teaching style and identify consistent flaws in student reasoning 
that were not evident from their oral participation. Second, it gave students an opportunity to improve 
their legal reasoning skills; importantly, this structure helped to equalize initial grade disparities that 
seemed clearly to align with cultural capital, such as having lawyers in one’s family. 
161. See, e.g., James W. Pennebaker, Samuel D. Gosling & Jason D. Ferrell, Daily Online Testing 
in Large Classes: Boosting College Performance While Reducing Achievement Gaps, 8 PLOS ONE,  
Nov. 2013, at 1. 
162. Sean Darling-Hammond & Kristen Holmquist, Creating Wise Classrooms to Empower 
Diverse Law Students: Lessons in Pedagogy from Transformative Law Professors, 25 BERKELEY LA RAZA 
L.J. 1, 15 (2015). 
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Disparities between incoming 1Ls in foundational knowledge about law 
school mechanics, including exams and grades, are an important cause of the  
race-, class-, and gender-based achievement gaps in law school.163 In other words, 
when we test students with one final at the end of the semester—particularly in 
their first semester—we are not just testing what they have learned and how well 
they can apply it; we are also testing how well their backgrounds have prepared them 
to apprehend the law school endeavor. This is particularly the case 1L year. First 
semester, we pile on four or five doctrinal courses in brand-new subjects for fifteen 
weeks, give them one exam, then rank them against each other and dole out the 
ever-important first semester grades that sort them into, or out of, contention for 
opportunities such as clerkships, journal memberships, and competitive summer 
positions. Why wouldn’t they adopt a fixed mindset and a gladiator mentality? We 
have structurally socialized them into believing that this is what being a law  
student means. 
Achievement disparities are also deepened by “stereotype threat,” a  
well-known and extensively researched social psychological phenomenon wherein 
a person’s performance is hampered by a fear that they will end up confirming 
negative stereotypes about members of a group to which they belong.164 As both 
quantitative165 and qualitative166 work has demonstrated, race, class, and gender are 
all sources of stereotype threat in law school.167 Nor is stereotype threat an 
inevitable fixture of law school classrooms. Simple pedagogical interventions make 
a difference. For example, one study suggests that reducing class size and making 
small modifications to assessment practices in doctrinal classes can reduce gender 
gaps in performance.168  
Cultivating a growth mindset, eliminating stereotype threat, and combating 
anxiety normalization are three examples of achievable goals in legal education. Yet, 
despite some changes around the margins, and shifts in clinical education 
notwithstanding, law school pedagogy looks a great deal like it did fifty years  
ago—especially for 1Ls. One reason for this lack of evolution is that law school is 
taught by law professors, and by and large, law professors represent a group that 
excelled under the current system. They may think that being so anxiety plagued 
that it hinders one’s exam performance is a sign of weakness or ineptitude, because 
law school anxiety did not hinder their own performance. They may not know what 
it feels like to be too depressed to ask for clerkship recommendation letters. They 
may not know what it feels like to make up excuses about why they cannot accept 
 
163. Id. at 6. 
164. E.g., Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test 
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 797 (1995). 
165. Darling-Hammond & Holmquist, supra note 162. 
166. YOUNG, supra note 31, at 75–106. 
167. See generally YUNG-YI DIANA PAN, INCIDENTAL RACIALIZATION: PERFORMATIVE 
ASSIMILATION IN LAW SCHOOL (2017). 
168. Daniel E. Ho & Mark G. Kelman, Does Class Size Affect the Gender Gap? A Natural 
Experiment in Law, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 291, 308–10 (2014). 
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classmates’ invitations out to dinner—when, in reality, it is too expensive. And they 
may never have been forced to think seriously about the connection between the 
social and pedagogical structure of law school and the prevalence of inequality and 
mental health crises in the profession. In other words, if we think that certain 
strategies were relatively good at teaching us the law, we are likely to believe it is the 
way the law should be taught—particularly if we have no formal pedagogical 
instruction, no structural support (e.g., teaching assistants to help with increased 
grading loads, teaching releases for course redesigns, or funds to attend teaching 
conferences), and no incentive to do things differently. 
B. Cognitive Cornerstones of a Stronger Profession 
As the previous Section detailed, one of the problems law students face is that 
they are so mired in the law school world that they tend to lose touch with the 
people, ideals, and activities that mattered to them before law school. On average, 
they become more insecure and more risk averse, grow less intrinsically motivated, 
and become extremely focused on attaining badges of law school success.169 The 
pervasiveness of these changes, coupled with the persistence of law students’ 
anxiety, depression, substance abuse, and self-harming behaviors into their 
professional practice, point to a need to teach students about metacognition. That 
is, we need to teach them to think about thinking: to track their own thought 
processes, to observe changes in it, and to reflect on the ways that their mind is and 
is not changing as they become lawyers. A recent survey of nearly 13,000 practicing 
lawyers in nineteen states suggest that major risk factors, such as problematic levels 
of alcohol consumption, are actually more prevalent among newer lawyers.170  
Cognitive phenomena like imposter syndrome and stereotype threat, social 
challenges like alienation and loneliness, problematic behaviors like drug abuse and 
alcohol abuse, victimizations like sexual and racial harassment, and mental health 
problems like depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideation are so rampant in law school 
and the legal profession that statistically speaking, a new lawyer is virtually 
guaranteed to experience at least one of them or to have a close friend who does. 
Yet by and large, we give them no metacognitive tools for handling these problems, 
and generally integrate nothing into the core curriculum that would systematically 
 
169. See JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, HOW LAWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY: A 
PROFESSION FAILS ITS CREATIVE MINDS (2005). 
170. BREE BUCHANAN, JAMES C. COYLE, ANNE BRAFFORD, DON CAMPBELL, JOSH CAMSON, 
CHARLES GRUBER, TERRY HARRELL, DAVID JAFFE, TRACY KEPLER, PATRICK KRILL, DONALD 
LEMONS, SARAH MYERS, CHRIS NEWBOLD, JAYNE REARDON, DAVID SHAHEED, LYNDA SHELY  
& WILLIAM SLEASE, THE PATH TO LAWYER WELL-BEING: PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
POSITIVE CHANGE 7 (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/
ThePathToLawyerWellBeingReportRevFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YVJ-MBGK]; Patrick  
R. Krill, Ryan Johnson & Linda Albert, The Prevalence of Substance Use and Other Mental Health 
Concerns Among American Attorneys, 10 J. ADDICTION MED. 46, 46–52 ( Jan./Feb. 2016), https://
journals.lww.com/journaladdictionmedicine/Fulltext/2016/02000/The_Prevalence_of_Substance_ 
Use_and_Other_Mental.8.aspx [https://perma.cc/M6KD-5LXH]. 
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combat them. Instead, these topics tend to be relegated to optional brown-bag talks 
and “wellness” reading lists.  
A profession plagued by the kinds of problems so prevalent among lawyers is 
unlikely to be able to engage in the kinds of outside-the-box thinking that serious 
reduction of the justice deficit will require. Indeed, lawyers who are unhappy in 
general, or who suffer from mental health problems, are significantly less likely to 
adequately perform even the most basic services for their clients; this is already a 
significant challenge in the delivery of competent legal services.171  
Textbooks for law school courses on the legal profession typically identify the 
profession’s most widespread problems, touching on topics from prevalence of 
alcohol abuse to the persistence of various diversity shortcomings, including race 
and ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation. However, teaching students that these 
things are problems in the legal profession does not teach them how to overcome 
them—nor could this realistically be done within most already-packed syllabi of 
existing courses on Legal Ethics and the Legal Profession. The other half of 
students’ education about the legal profession should be about their professional 
responsibility to reverse negative trends, coupled with concrete strategies for doing 
so. Currently, most women law students learn that they are statistically unlikely to 
become law firm partners.172 However, neither they, nor their male colleagues, are 
routinely equipped with the tools to recognize gender inequality in 
microinteractions or how to hold their own law firms accountable for inclusion. 
And as Deborah Rhode has pointed out, “Even legal ethics courses, which are 
logical forums for [issues of inequality and access to justice], typically focus on the 
law of lawyering and often omit broader questions about the distribution of legal 
services.”173 Southworth and Fisk’s The Legal Profession: Ethics in Contemporary 
Practice offers some excellent examples of how legal profession courses can 
effectively draw on interdisciplinary scholarship and the use of small-group 
problem-solving to illustrate to students the centrality of these issues to the practice 
of law.174 These exercises give students a chance to try on their own sense of agency 
as legal professionals, and social science research could be leveraged to build on 
Southworth and Fisk’s pedagogical innovations even more, giving concrete 
strategies for addressing substantive problems.  
Like mental health, topics related to professional inequality tend to be the 
subject of lunch talks or small elective seminars. This relegation sends the implicit 
message that these kinds of problems are not, per se, the responsibility of the entire 
 
171. Rhode, An Agenda for Legal Education, supra note 95, at 531. 
172. AM. BAR ASS’N, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE LAW 2 (2019), https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/women/current_glance_2019.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/8V4K-RM63] (showing that 22.7% of partners are women, 19% of equity partners are 
women, and 22% of managing partners at the largest 200 law firms are women). 
173. Id. at 545. 
174. See generally ANN SOUTHWORTH & CATHERINE L. FISK, THE LEGAL  
PROFESSION: ETHICS IN CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE (2d ed. 2019). 
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profession, but only of those who choose to think about it. But just as students who 
would prefer not to think about contracts are still required to understand offer and 
acceptance, students who would prefer not to engage with wellness in the legal 
profession should still be required to come out of law school equipped with the 
tools to, say, recognize a microaggression or intervene when a colleague shows signs 
of depression. These cognitive tools are not icing on the cake; they are at the core 
of the profession. Until we make law schools into places that produce healthier, 
stronger, more resilient lawyers, it is unrealistic to suppose that they will produce 
lawyers who can effectively address the tremendously diverse justice needs of 
everyday people in their communities. 
V. HOW COULD IT HAPPEN? 
I often speak at law schools about issues related to student success and law 
school happiness. As a part of my visits, I am sometimes invited to lunch by the 
faculty chair of the curriculum committee, or the Dean, or the Dean of Students, to 
talk about law school reform. They begin by telling me that they realize their 
students are depressed and anxious, that much of the law school curriculum is 
disconnected from practice, and that students tend to lose a sense of purpose about 
the practice of law before even finishing their 1L year. Inevitably, my host asks, 
“How can we make this law school a better place?” A few minutes into my  
answer: the color drains from their face. “Uh—” they interrupt, chuckling 
apologetically. “I was thinking more along the lines of a lunch talk or a  
speaker series.”  
Lunch talks, speaker series, book clubs, and the like can be useful. It would be 
incorrect to dismiss them as mere band-aids, but it would also be incorrect to think 
that they represent the deeper and more permanent kinds of change that law schools 
so sorely need. Additionally, instead of thinking about how legal education and law 
school’s social structures could create better-prepared lawyers, it puts the onus on 
law students to fit even more events and organizations into their already  
packed schedules.  
Law students are socialized to be status conscious and attuned to institutional 
prestige. Telling students that particular types of training are important, then 
keeping these types of training optional, pass/fail, and decentral to the “core” 
curriculum sends the institutional message that these types of knowledge are not 
important enough for the law school to invest serious resources. Similar messages 
are sent when guest speakers and instructors for particular courses are almost 
invariably not tenured or tenure-track law school faculty members. I am not 
suggesting that tenure-track faculty members are better teachers than non-tenure-
track faculty members, only that students apprehend the different level of structural 
and financial institutional commitment involved in each teaching assignment.  
Imagine that in lieu of actually teaching Contracts, a law school offered a series 
of brown-bag talks about Contracts-related topics or encouraged its students to start 
a Contracts club. Or imagine what it would do to the perceived importance of 
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Property if a law school decided that henceforth Property would meet once per 
week, taught as an optional seminar by an adjunct instructor. Justifiably or not, the 
importance of these subjects would diminish in students’ eyes; students’ dedication 
to the course would lessen, and the doctrinal subject would quickly come to be seen 
as less important than required courses. To create law students who are versatile 
enough thinkers and resilient enough professionals to tackle the access to justice 
crisis, we need to allocate our structural resources accordingly. If we want the topics 
I discussed in the previous Section to make a difference in law schools, we need 
them to be part of the law school curriculum’s backbone.175 We might imagine any 
number of creative ways that the suggestions above could be incorporated into 
required law school courses. For example, we could add a few new required classes 
while giving students more flexibility about when to take some of the doctrinal 
classes usually required in 1L year.176 We might imagine counterparts to traditional 
doctrinal classes, such as a semester-long civil justice system course to complement 
a traditional course on Civil Procedure, or a course on solving problems in the 
profession to complement a traditional course on Legal Ethics and the Legal 
Profession. The ABA’s requirements leave a great deal of leeway for innovation.177 
There are hurdles, of course. Foremost, law schools are understandably 
sensitive to their place in the U.S. News and World Report (USNWR) ranking, which 
makes them risk averse.178 For this reason, the most likely candidates for serious 
change may be those least affected by the ranking: law schools toward the very top 
of the USNWR heap (where innovation is unlikely to threaten their rank or their 
 
175. I should note that we need more longitudinal research on law students, particularly during 
1L year, to understand the dynamics of socialization that law students undergo and its effects. In Bliss’s 
in-depth longitudinal qualitative examination of law students’ “public interest drift” at one top law 
school, he argues that giving students more curricular opportunities to think about professional identity, 
particularly in their first year, will help them find practice settings where they can be more satisfied and 
more effective. John Bliss, From Idealists to Hired Guns? An Empirical Analysis of “Public Interest 
Drift” in Law School, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1973, 1973–74 (2018); see also John Bliss, Divided  
Selves: Professional Role Distancing Among Law Students and New Lawyers in a Period of Market Crisis, 
42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 855, 855 (2017) (finding that at the elite law school he studied, students bound 
for big firms reported increased professional role distancing, while students who pursued public interest 
careers ended up with a more integrated notion of professional identity). See generally CARRIE YANG 
COSTELLO, PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY CRISIS: RACE, CLASS, GENDER, AND SUCCESS AT 
PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS (2005). 
176. Property and constitutional law are the obvious candidates to shift out of the 1L rotation, 
since a handful of law schools have experimented with this already, but arguments could be made for 
others as well; I will not take up that discussion here. This would also have the benefit of allowing room 
for more advanced skills instruction, such as negotiation, mediation, and advanced legal research, earlier 
in their law school careers. 
177. Nor am I suggesting that, in and of itself, curricular reform will suddenly produce  
well-designed, equitably distributed legal services. But I would argue that it is a necessary condition for 
the legal profession to take meaningful steps toward these goals. 
178. As flawed as the rankings are, they also reflect prestige; for many students, the rankings 
greatly influence where they apply to law school and where they choose to attend. Nor is law school 
ranking unrelated to job placement after law school. See Top 50 Law Schools, ABOVE L., https://
abovethelaw.com/law-school-rankings/top-law-schools-2020/ [https://perma.cc/XD4V-32QR] 
( last visited Jan. 22, 2021 ). 
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students’ job placements); law schools toward the very bottom (where innovation 
may help and probably would not hurt); and perhaps most promisingly, law schools 
that dominate a particular region of the United States or are the only  
ABA-accredited law school in their state (because their unique situation often puts 
them in less direct competition with other law schools for high-scoring entering 
students and job placements for graduates).179 Other potential hurdles include 
faculty hiring,180 student resistance,181 and institutional inertia.  
But none of the substantive proposals I have offered in this Article are 
especially radical. Indeed, some are well worn, familiar territory to anyone familiar 
with the legal education and/or access to justice literature. Yet on the occasions I 
have shared these ideas with law school deans or faculty chairs of curriculum 
committees, I have been struck by their predictions about the resistance these 
proposed changes would meet: faculty would never approve, faculty would see these 
changes as too “touchy-feely,” faculty would interpret course additions as threats to 
their own curricular domains.  
But I am not convinced that—in the current political moment, faced with an 
enormous justice deficit, growing social inequality in the wake of a continuing global 
pandemic, a rapidly changing legal profession, and a student body plagued with 
anxiety, depression, and alcoholism—they are correct. Nor am I convinced that if 
they are provided with support and structural incentives to implement the changes, 
and evidence that the changes will help students become better lawyers, most faculty 
members would oppose the main curricular additions and pedagogical changes I 
have outlined. Presumably, no one wants students to experience stereotype threat, 
or develop drinking problems, or be ignorant of how nonlawyers think about law, 
or become so entrenched in particular thought patterns that they cannot 
 
179. Law schools in this third category include, for example, the William S. Richardson School 
of Law at the University of Hawaii, Hawaii Law Schools, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/law-schools/
hawaii/ [https://perma.cc/A5CL-NVAB] (July 2020); the University of New Mexico School of Law, 
New Mexico Law Schools, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/law-schools/new-mexico/ [https:// 
perma.cc/R8RA-8H4E] (July 2020); the University of South Dakota School of Law, South Dakota Law 
Schools, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/law-schools/south-dakota/ [https://perma.cc/X5US-J54Y] 
(July 2020); the University of Maine School of Law, Maine Law Schools, JUSTIA, https://
www.justia.com/law-schools/maine/ [https://perma.cc/6QEX-AXT8] (July 2020); and the 
Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, Montana Law Schools, JUSTIA, 
https://www.justia.com/law-schools/montana/ [https://perma.cc/4CLD-HZAM] (July 2020). 
180. People in a given position tend to think that new people they select for that position should 
have backgrounds like their own. Hiring tenure-track professors who could teach courses that 
incorporate access to justice, legal consciousness, social psychology, mindfulness, design thinking, or 
other subjects I have discussed may mean occasionally prioritizing a less traditional or more 
interdisciplinary scholar over a “safer” one who ticks the usual boxes (federal clerkship, a year or two 
at a law firm, etc.). For a discussion of how “our lack of adequate research on access to justice is partly 
attributable to structural problems in the market for legal scholarship,” see Rhode, An Agenda for Legal 
Education, supra note 95, at 542–44. 
181. For example, we might imagine that law students would worry about whether any 
curricular changes could put them at a disadvantage, relative to their peers at other law schools, for 
summer jobs, clerkships, and other opportunities. 
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contemplate extralegal solutions to clients’ justice problems. Research has given us 
the tools to create a better legal profession; we would be foolish to keep doing what 
we are doing as if we do not know any better. Now we do.  
CONCLUSION: AN ACCESS TO JUSTICE MODEL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 
In this Article, I have taken seriously the idea that access to justice, defined as 
the equitable resolution of justiciable problems via legal or nonlegal means, can and 
should fall partly on the shoulders of the legal profession. I then asked: If we wanted 
legal education to most effectively address the access to justice crisis, how might 
law schools change?  
I have suggested that prioritizing access to justice compels reconsidering 
aspects of legal education in at least three major areas: greater versatility of thinking 
and problem-solving, including understanding how everyday people think about 
law; imparting a broader understanding of the ecosystem of justiciable problems 
and a critical evaluation of lawyers’ place in it; and structuring law school to help 
reduce the incidence of several pernicious problems, including mental health issues, 
that have plagued the profession for decades. We need lawyers who can parse 
statutes and work with their communities to create proactive interventions, who can 
read contracts and combat microaggressions, and who can write answers to legal 
complaints and understand the factors that make clients feel heard. Placing access 
to justice at the center of legal education would not threaten or supplant the 
traditional model. It would create lawyers who—instead of reactively meeting legal 
needs—can proactively help solve our civil justice crisis. 
